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THE PARENT TRAP: DIFFERENTIAL FAMILIAL POWER IN
SAME-SEX FAMILIES
DEIRDRE M. BOWEN*
ABSTRACT
Do intact same-sex couples where one member of the couple
became pregnant with assisted reproduction or was the primary
adopter, and the other member became a parent through second
parent adoption, understand the legal protections afforded them? In
short the answer is no. An interesting family dynamic arises around
those who can claim the true status as parent based on their legal
understandings of parenthood and their interactions with the domi-
nant culture. While high profile custody cases on this issue have
been decided in the United States with varying results, no research
has examined the impact of uneven legal protections afforded to gay
fathers and mothers on intact same-sex families, until now.
The result of research conducted on this issue indicated that
second parent adopters had much less emotional power in the family,
but often had more economic power. Even in long-term stable rela-
tionships, non-biological mothers and second parent adoptive fathers
expressed significant worries about this emotional power differential.
On the other hand, biologically connected mothers and some primary
adoptive fathers were concerned about whether their partners would
continue to financially support their children should the couple's rela-
tionship dissolve. Both parents had misconceptions about what kind
of legal protections or obligations the law afforded these second parent
adopters should the couple end their relationship. Furthermore, the
families' interactions with the larger culture served to further under-
mine the stability of the family, as they worried whether their family
would be culturally and legally recognized if they traveled from one
state to another. Ultimately, I conclude that second parent adopters
become imprisoned parents within the family and across the larger
culture because of current legal frameworks and policies. Recommen-
dations are made for legislatures, courts, policy-makers, and lawyers
to expand parentage presumptions, allow for joint adoption outside
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of the marital context, and reframe how lawyers counsel same-sex
couples as they engage in family formation.
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INTRODUCTION
The decision to include children in same-sex families has been
on the rise in the last twenty years with the increased availability
of assisted reproductive technology.1 In fact, the 2000 United States
Census reports that same-sex couples live in ninety-six percent of all
counties in the country, with approximately thirty percent of lesbian
couples and twenty percent of gay couples raising children.2 A sig-
nificant number of law review articles have explored the treatment of
these families within the law in regard to legal parentage at the time
the relationship ends,3 while relatively few articles have examined
1. See Courtney G. Joslin, The Legal Parentage of Children Born to Same-Sex
Couples: Developments in the Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 683, 683 (2005) (stating children are
increasingly being born into planned same-sex families); Laura L. Williams, Note, The
Unheard Victims of the Refusal to Legalize Same-Sex Marriage: The Reluctance to
Recognize Same-Sex Partners as Parents Instead of Strangers, 9 J. GENDERRACE &JUST.
419,419 (2005) (stating"many homosexual couples are having children through artificial
means").
2. LISA BENNETT & GARY J. GATES, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., THE COST OF
MARRIAGE INEQUALITY TO CHILDREN AND THEIR SAME-SEX PARENTS: A HUMAN RIGHTS
CAMPAIGN FOUNDATION REPORT 3 (2004), available at http://www.hrc.orgtdocuments/
costkids.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 1, at 683; Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have
Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother
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how same-sex couples navigate their families as they plan for and
have children in the face of constantly evolving social and legal real-
ities.4 Instead, much of the research on same-sex families has con-
cerned the effects of children raised in these households.5
This article explores the cultural and legal definitions gay and
lesbian families give to parenthood and what that means for them
in the current socio-legal context. Specifically, I examine how they
culturally "do family,"6 how same-sex couples decide how to acquire
children, what legal protections they avail themselves of, what they
understand those protections to afford them, and finally what they
understand as the social and emotional costs of achieving these per-
ceived protections.
and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 461-62 (1990); Richard F. Storrow,
Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement: The Case Against Marital Status
Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305, 305-
06 (2006); Lisa S. Chen, Comment, Second-Parent Adoptions: Are They Entitled to Full
Faith and Credit?, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 171 (2005); Oren Goldhaber, Note, '7
Want My Mommies" The Cry for Mini-DOMAs to Recognize the Best Interests of the
Children of Same-Sex Couples, 45 FAm. CT. REV. 287, 287 (2007); Maggie Manternach,
Note, Where is My Other Mommy?: Applying the Presumed Father Provision of the
Uniform Parentage Act to Recognize the Rights of Lesbian Mothers and Their Children, 9
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 385, 385-86 (2005); John G. New, Note, 'Aren't You Lucky You
Have Two Mamas?" Redefining Parenthood in Light of Evolving Reproductive Tech-
nologies and Social Change, 81 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 773, 773-74 (2006); Margaret S.
Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate Parentage for Lesbian Co-
Parents, 49 VILL. L. REV. 363, 363-66 (2004); Williams, supra note 1, at 419.
4. See Kathryn Almack, Seeking Sperm:Accounts of Lesbian Couples'Reproductive
Decision-Making and Understandings of the Needs of the Child, 20 INT'L J.L. POL'Y &
FAM. 1, 1 (2006); Erica Haimes & Kate Weiner, 'Everybody's Got a Dad...- Issues for
Lesbian Families in the Management of Donor Insemination, 22 SOC. OF HEALTH &
ILLNESS 477, 477 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Homosexual Parents, 31 ADOLESCENCE,
757 (1996); Julie Schwartz Gottman, Children of Gay and Lesbian Parents, in HOMO-
SEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS 177-193 (Frederick W. Bozett & Marvin B. Sussman,
eds., 1990); Nanette Gartrell et. al., The National Lesbian Family Study: 4. Interviews with
the 10-Year-Old Children, 75 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 518, 518-19 (2005); Elizabeth
D. Gibbs, Psychosocial Development of Children Raised by Lesbian Mothers: A Review
of Research, 8 WOMEN & THERAPY 65, 65-66 (1989); Abbie E. Goldberg, Talking About
Family: Disclosure Practices of Adults Raised by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Parents, 28
J. FAM. ISSUES 100, 101 (2007); Fiona Tasker & Susan Golombok, Adults Raised as
Children in Lesbian Families, 65 AMER. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 203, 203 (1995).
6. Amaryll Perlesz et. al., Family in Transition: Parents, Children and Grandparents
in Lesbian Families Give Meaning to 'Doing Family,' 28 J. OF FAm. THER. 175,176 (2006).
The phrase "doing family" represents the notion that family is in a constant state of
transition. Id. Furthermore, it represents the view that an essentialist approach to the
family as a discrete, heteronormative institution (i.e. one mother and one father) is no
longer an appropriate basis of analysis. See, e.g., Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two?
Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple
Parents, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 309,309-12 (2007); Judith Stacey, Gay and Lesbian Families:
Queer Like Us, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY: A REPORT OF
THE BERKLEY FAMILY FORUM 144, 165 (Mary Ann Mason et. al., eds., 2nd ed. 2003).
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I argue that what emerges from this data is the idea of the im-
prisoned family on two levels. First, within the family, parents have
different levels of status and power because of their differing relation-
ships with their children. This is due to the nature of law's willingness
to recognize only certain types of parentage (biological versus non-
biological parents),7 which can cause an emotional imprisonment for
the parent whose relationship with the child may not be legally recog-
nized (the non-biological parent). Second, due to these differing levels
of legal parental recognition that vary across state lines, same-sex
families are vulnerable to having their families dissolved as they
move from one state to the next.' While severe costs to the parent-
child relationship exist at the time of a couple's dissolution of their
relationship under the current legal climate,9 I suggest that the same
legal climate exacts costs on intact same-sex family relationships.
The significance of understanding the impact of the law's treat-
ment of same-sex families from their own perspective is well articu-
lated by Timothy E. Lin:
No matter how courts attempt to distinguish societal trends and
views from their own determination of the legal status of lesbian
and gay families, a strict separation is impossible. Every decision
that courts make.., whether it be to affirm same-sex family struc-
tures, or to disparage their worth, tells a story that influences
other courts, potential lesbian and gay parents, and society."0
He goes on to argue that courts can be influenced by the narratives
of the parties involved since 'lesbian and gay narratives have tremen-
dous informational value.... These stories can effectively convey
the 'substantial social costs of the exclusionary [or discriminatory]
policy.""' While it is necessary and important to appreciate how the
law responds to new and emerging family formations, it is equally
important to reflect the mirror back on those families and examine
how they, in turn, respond to the law. This article offers an empirical
examination of same-sex families' understanding and response to
the law through the use of qualitative data gathered from eight gay
couples and ten lesbian couples in Washington State who planned
and had at least one child together.
7. See Williams, supra note 1, at 420.
8. See Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291, 293.
9. See Williams, supra note 1, at 420.
10. Timothy E. Lin, Note, Social Norms and Judicial Decisionmaking: Examining
the Role of Narratives in Same-Sex Adoption Cases, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 739, 767 (1999).
11. Id. at 790 (citation omitted).
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Part I of this article begins with an examination of how the law
treats children born to same-sex couples, what options exist for same-
sex couples to establish parentage, what costs emerge as a result of
differential treatment of married couples, and how the outcomes of
recent cases will affect these couples as states grapple with the issues
of couple recognition and same-sex parent-child relationship recogni-
tion across state lines. Part II explores the impact of this varied legal
climate on same-sex families, from their perspective, as they engage
in family formation both legally and culturally. Part III of this article
makes recommendations for consideration by the judiciary, legisla-
ture, and others involved in the development of family public policy.
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SURROUNDING SAME-SEX FAMILY
FORMATION
12
For the most part, same-sex couples have availed themselves
of two approaches in engaging in family formation: adoption and
assisted reproductive technology, 3 with varied legal outcomes. 4 In
this section, I explore how these two methods have worked for same-
sex couples.
A. Adoption
As adoption has a much longer history in the United States and
abroad, it is heavily regulated with varying results within the United
States as well as internationally, particularly for same-sex couples.
For example, while adoption law does not require adoptive parents to
be married, some states do not allow unmarried partners, and in turn
same-sex couples, to jointly adopt an unrelated child.15 Sixteen states
12. Virtually all of the cases discussed in this paper involve lesbian couples and their
children because that is where the litigation tends to be, but this article discusses issues
faced by all same-sex households.
13. Other methods exist, such as sexual intercourse with a donor who will waive
parental rights. In some cases, the donor may have no contact with the resulting child
or play a limited role with no recognized legal relationship to the child.
14. See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 3, at 356-66, n.19.
15. Massachusetts, Vermont, New Jersey, California and Washington, D.C. explicitly
allow for joint adoption by same-sex couples because of the legal rights afforded to these
couples via marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships respectively. See Cal. Fain.
Code §§ 8601, 8603 (West 2008); D. C. CODE § 16-302 (2008); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
210, §1 (West 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-43 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-101
(2008). Alternatively, Oklahoma, Colorado, and Mississippi make same-sex joint adoption
virtually impossible because of bans on adoption by unmarried couples. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-5-202 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2008); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7503-1.1 (West 2008). Florida and Utah ban all lesbian and gay
individuals and couples from adoption. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2008);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-115 (West 2008).
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contemplated initiatives on the November 2008 ballot to ban gays and
lesbians from adopting children.'6 Similarly, in international adoptions
many countries do not allow for joint adoption by unmarried couples,
or may specifically bar same-sex couples from adopting." By disallow-
ing joint adoption, same-sex couples cannot acquire legal parentage
simultaneously, if at all, because only one member of the couple will
be permitted to adopt the child. 8 Furthermore, unless the couple re-
sides in a state that permits second-parent adoption, the second mem-
ber will never be allowed to acquire the same parental rights.'9 This
legal vulnerability can sometimes lead to tragic results.2 °
16. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan,
Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and West Virginia
all considered such initiatives. Andrea Stone, Drives to Ban Gay Ban Adoption Heat Up
in 16 States, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews/
nation2006-02-20-gay-adoption-x.htm; States Weigh Ban on Gay Adoption by Gay Parents
(NPR radio broadcast Mar. 2, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templateststory/story
.php?storyld=5241925. The Tennessee legislature introduced such a bill on January 30,
2008. David W. Shelton, Op-Ed., Anti-Gay Adoption Bill Filed in Tennessee, CLARKSVILLE
ONLINE (Tennessee), Jan. 31, 2008, http://www.clarksvilleonline.com/2008/01/31/anti-gay-
adoption-bill-filed-in-tennessee.
17. Only Sweden, the Netherlands, Andorra, Spain, the United Kingdom, Belgium,
and Canada allow for same-sex joint adoption. See ILGA Europe, Marriage and
Partnership Rights for Same-Sex Partners: Country-by-Country, http://www.ilga-
europe.org/europe/issues/marriage-and-partnership/marriage-and-partnership-rights
_forsame sexpartnerscountrybyscountry (last visited Nov. 3, 2008); Danny Sandor,
Case Note, Joint Adoption by Same Sex Spouses in Canada, 43 FAM. MArrrERS27 (1996).
On the other hand, countries like China and Guatemala, where many adoptions occur, will
not knowingly allow a gay or lesbian individual to adopt a child. Scott D. Ryan et. al.,
Coming Out of the Closet: Opening Agencies to Gay and Lesbian Adoptive Parents, 49
SOC. WORK 85, 86 (2004). In these cases not only is one member of the couple excluded from
the adoption, the individual who is adopting must remain closeted throughout the adop-
tion process. However, it seems likely that under the rules of the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption ("Hague
Adoption Convention"), which took effect in the United States on April 1, 2008, home
studies will be required of both prospective parents; thus same-sex couples will no longer
have the option of remaining closeted. See World Organization for Cross-Border Co-
operation in Civil and Commercial Matters, Hague Conference on Private International
Law, Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, art. 5, 15, 17, May 29, 1993, available at http://www.hcch.netl
index en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69 (entered into force May 1, 1995); Derek Repp,
New Intercountry Adoption Standards Implemented in United States, AMERICA.GOV, May 1,
2008, http://www.america.gov/stldiversity-english/2008/May/20080430094700zjsredna 0
.1 149866.html.
18. See ILGA Europe, supra note 17. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 691.
19. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 691.
20. Id. at 689 (citing Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991)). See, e.g., B.F. v. T.D., 194 S.W.3d 310,310-12 (Ky. 2006) (holding adoptive mother's
partner lacked standing to assert custody or visitation rights either statutorily or equi-
tably because no documents recognized her as a guardian, and although she did provide
financial support, she was not the primary caretaker of the child); In re the Interest of
Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Wis. 1991) (holding lesbian ex-partner of a child's adoptive
mother had no right to custody or visitation as she stood as a third party), overruled by
In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
THE PARENT TRAP
Second-parent adoption allows the partner of a legally recognized
parent to adopt the latter's child with the parent's consent, without
terminating the legally recognized parent's legal rights."' It is a legal
device that allows unmarried couples to both adopt a child in succes-
sion, if not simultaneously.22 Currently, second-parent adoptions are
available in ten states and in some counties of fifteen other states.23
This, however, leaves a large segment of gay and lesbian families
without the option of second-parent adoption.24 Specifically, twenty-
nine percent of same-sex families live in jurisdictions where the
availability of second-parent adoption is unclear or is expressly pro-
hibited.25 In fact, Miami-Dade County is ranked ninth in the United
States of counties with the greatest number of same-sex couples with
children, 26 yet second-parent adoption for same-sex couples is illegal
in Florida."
Aside from the jurisdictional bars discussed above, adoption as
a way to establish parentage brings other problems for same-sex
21. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 691.
22. See id.; JOAN M. BURDA, GAY, LESBIAN, AND TRANSGENDER CLIENTS: A LAWYER'S
GUIDE 90 (2008).
23. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 691. California, Colorado, Connecticut, and Vermont
allow for second-parent adoption by statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 9000(b) (West 2008);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-5-208(5), 19-5-210(1.5), 19-5-211(1.5) (West 2008); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-724(3) (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 1-102(b) (2008). In addition,
a California court ruled that the state's adoption law extends to same-sex couples not
registered as domestic partners. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 554, 565-
66, 571-72 (Cal. App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 2003). The District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania all have court rulings that
interpret their state adoption laws to allow for second-parent adoption. In re M.M.D. &
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888,
898-99 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1259-60 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319-21 (Mass. 1993); In re the Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In re Jacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F. & R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1200, 1202
(Pa. 2002). Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and Washington all have
certain counties where trial courts have granted second parent adoptions. Katharine
Swan, The Rainbow Babies, All About Second Parent Adoptions for Gay Families, http://
www.therainbowbabies.comSecondParentAdoption.html (last visited Nov. 4,2008). The
appellate courts in Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin have ruled that second parent adop-
tion is not possible under their state's adoption laws. In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d
374, 383 (Neb. 2002); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1072 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);
In the Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 682-83, 686 (Wis. 1994). It is unclear
whether state adoption laws permit second-parent adoption in the remaining twenty-two
states. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 691.
24. See BENNETT & GATES, supra note 2, at 8 fig. 2.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 5.
27. Gilmore v. Sec'y of the Dept. of Children and Fain. Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 806-07
(1lth Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
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couples. Although states have traditionally recognized the final, valid
adoption decrees of other states, 28 in accordance with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution," even if that
state does not allow second-parent adoption, 0 at least one state leg-
islature attempted to ban second-parent adoptions involving same-
sex couples performed in other states.3'
In Finstuen v. Edmondson,32 three families challenged the valid-
ity of Oklahoma's statute, stating that it violated the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause,
and the Right to Travel.33 The case involved two lesbian families in
which one partner in both families had used second-parent adoption
to establish legal parentage for the non-biological mother.' The third
family involved a gay couple who, in an open adoption, agreed to take
the child "back to Oklahoma to visit her birth family." 3 The adoption
was finalized in Washington State, but the couple sought a birth cer-
tificate from Oklahoma.36 Initially, the Department of Health issued
a certificate with only one of the fathers' names on it.37 The Oklahoma
Attorney General issued an opinion stating that birth certificates
must contain both fathers' names in accordance with the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, requiring states to recognize Washington's final
adoption decree. 8 In response to this opinion, the legislature enacted
the amendment to the Oklahoma adoption code at issue in the case.39
28. Barbara Cox noted that in 2000, Mississippi enacted a ban on same-sex couples
adopting in its state, but rejected a proposed clause that would have refused to recognize
same-sex couples' adoptions issued in other states. Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian
and Gay Parents Must Be Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause Despite Anti-Marriage Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31
CAP. U. L. REv. 751, 781 (2003).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
30. See, e.g., Russell v. Bridgens, 647 N.W.2d 56, 58-9 (Neb. 2002) (noting that
Nebraska must recognize a second-parent adoption granted in Pennsylvania, even
though Nebraska would not have permitted such an adoption); Gay & Lesbian Advocates
& Defenders, Bibliography of Adoption Cases 8, http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/
publications/adoption-bibliography.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2008) (summarizing Erez v.
Starr, 97 CVD 64 (Durham Gen. Ct. 1997), appeal dismissed, COA99-1534 (N.C. Ct. App.
2000) and stating that the judge in this case found North Carolina must honor second-
parent adoption granted in Washington state) [hereinafter GLAD].
31. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (West 2008).
32. 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), affd inpart, Finstuen v. Crutcher,
496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
33. Id. at 1300.
34. Id. at 1301-02.
35. Id. at 1301.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma struck
down the amendment on all of the grounds alleged except the Right
to Travel.4" The court found that because the two fathers had adopted
from Oklahoma but had not actually traveled to the state, they did
not have standing and dismissed their claim.4' Although the legisla-
tion is no longer in force, it suggests cultural resistance to same-sex
parentage is strong enough to be expressed in political action, and
that the dominant culture has permission to question or undermine
the legitimacy of same-sex parents.
For those families who do live in jurisdictions that allow for
second-parent adoption, it can be difficult finding access to lawyers
who have an expertise in this area.42 Furthermore, the expense of
completing a second-parent adoption, after expending considerable
resources on an international4" or domestic adoption,44 may be cost-
prohibitive for some couples.45 In addition to the legal costs, the state
requirements surrounding second-parent adoption mean additional
expenditures46 for evaluations by a licensed psychologist, and a home
study by a social worker to determine if the adoption is in the best
interests of the child.47 These evaluations also mean having to divulge
one's sexual orientation, creating a risk to the parent's privacy and
exposure to bias, a concern that also exists with joint adoption pro-
ceedings.4" In some cases, couples are simply not aware that a second
adoption is necessary, may not want to adopt, or cannot adopt.
49
40. Id. at 1315.
41. Id. at 1304, 1315.
42. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 692.
43. International adoption can cost $7,000-$30,000. See Adoption.com, Adoption
Costs, http://costs.adoption.com (last visited Sep. 26, 2008).
44. Domestic adoption can cost $5,000-$40,000. Id.
45. A second-parent adoption can cost $2,500-$3,000. See Manternach, supra note 3,
at 411 (citing Carol Ness, Lesbian Moms Gain Rights, S.F. EXAMINER, May 2, 1999, at A-i).
46. For example, the Department of Social Services (DSS) may charge an investigation
fee of $1,250. See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples
in a Brave New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 21 n.118 (1999).
47. See id. at 6-7 (discussing the California DSS process of home study); BURDA, supra
note 22, at 85 (stating common statutory adoption requirements include a home study
and determination of the child's best interests).
48. See Scott D. Ryan & Scottye Cash, Adoptive Families Headed by Gay or Lesbian
Parents: A Threat ... or Hidden Resource?, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POLy 443, 460 table
2 (2004).
49. As Julie Shapiro points out, a child adopted or born of a previous heterosexual
relationship in which both biological or adoptive parents are still involved with the child,
cannot be adopted by the parent's new partner (the same is true for heterosexual couples).
See Julie Shapiro, A Lesbian-Centered Critique of Second-Parent Adoptions, 14 BERKELEY
WOMEN's L.J. 17, 27 (1999). In addition, prospective second-parent adopters may find
that criminal, drug, or alcohol abuse histories will prevent them from adopting. See id. at
31. Finally, lesbian and gay families that do not fit the heteronormative nuclear family
model may also have their applications denied. See id. at 31-32.
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One further issue in second-parent adoption is the waiting
period, which courts do not often waive.5" During the waiting period,
the petitioning parent does not have the legal status of parent, which
means the child cannot enjoy the benefits and protections that the
partner could otherwise provide.5 This leaves the child in a vulnera-
ble position if the legal parent were to die or be unavailable to sign
medical consent forms.52 It also leaves the petitioning parent in a
defenseless state should the relationship end prior to the completion
of the adoption or should the legal parent change his or her mind in
consenting to the adoption.53 This situation could leave the petitioning
parent without any legal rights to the child.54 Similarly, should the
petitioning parent change his or her mind about adopting the child
during this waiting period, he or she has no legal obligations to the
child he or she jointly intended to bring in to the family.5" Thus, the
"birth" parent may also be put in a vulnerable position.
These outcomes starkly contrast the treatment of married cou-
ples. Not only does every state in the nation allow married couples
to jointly adopt, but all states also recognize step-parent adoption,
in which a parent's new spouse may adopt the parent's child with
consent and without terminating the other parent's legal rights.56
While second-parent adoptions require pre- and post-placement home
studies, a waiting period and a psychological evaluation, these re-
quirements are frequently waived in step-parent adoptions in favor
of streamlining the process.5" Courts give great weight to the parent's
spouse's petition to adopt.5" In most cases, unless a same-sex couple
lives in Massachusetts, California, or Connecticut, where marriage
is available to them,59 or in states with civil unions, they are barred
50. A typical second-parent adoption can take six to eight months to complete. Doskow,
supra note 46, at 21.
51. See National Center for Lesbian Rights, Adoption by Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual
Parents: An Overview of Current Law, 9 (2004), http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/
adptn04.pdf?docID=1221.
52. See id.
53. See Doskow, supra note 46, at 9-12.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See id.
56. Storrow, supra note 3, at 335-36.
57. Id. at 336-37. See SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 174-75 (2003).
58. See Storrow, supra note 3, at 334-35.
59. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 433-34 (Cal. 2008) (holding a statute limiting
marriage to opposite sex couples violated the constitution) (note, however, that as this
article went to press, California voters passed Proposition 8, which reverses this decision
and amends the California constitution to ban gay marriage. See Los Angeles: No More
Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages, CNN, Nov. 6, 2008); Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 567-68 (Mass. 2004) (discussing Goodridge v. Dep't. of Pub.
Health, 440 Mass. 309 (2003), where state law allowing same-sex marriage was upheld);
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from taking advantage of the more efficient process of step-parent
adoption.6"
B. Assisted Reproduction in Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships
The increased use of assisted reproduction61 by both heterosexual
and homosexual couples, married or not, has led to a complex set of
responses by courts, as the law seeks to catch up with these new ap-
proaches to family formation and the issues of parentage." Assisted
reproduction comes in a variety of formats.63 Artificial insemination
uses an anonymous or known sperm donor to impregnate a female
member of a partnership. 4 In vitro fertilization, also known as IVF,
uses a couple's own genetic material or a donated egg and/or sperm,
which is then fertilized outside the uterus and implanted in a female
member of the partnership. 5 More complex techniques include sur-
rogacy, in which a male member of a partnership's sperm or donor
sperm is used to impregnate a surrogate, and gestational surrogacy,
in which IVF using an anonymous egg and sperm donation/sperm
from a male member of the partnership is fertilized and later im-
planted in a surrogate mother who will carry the child to term for the
benefit of a couple intending to be the child's parents.6 The treatment
of parentage for the children born from these techniques has been
largely determined by the nature of the relationship between the two
people claiming to be the child's parents.67 I begin with an exploration
Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135, 2008 WL 4530885 at *1, *4,
*46-47 (Conn. 2008) (holding a statute restricting marriage to heterosexual couples violated
same-sex couples equal protection rights and was unconstitutional in Connecticut).
60. Vermont allows a partner of a biological parent to engage in step-parent adoption
if the partner is in a civil union with that biological parent. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A,
§ 4-101(b) (2008); Vermont Judiciary, Vermont Probate Court: Stepparent/Partner
Adoptions, http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/courts/probate/probateinfoladoptsteppar.aspx
(last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (stating that "partner" is not defined in the legislation, but
it is usually interpreted as a person who has been part of a civil union).
61. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION ET. AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERvs., 2000 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL
SUMMARYAND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 57 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/
ArchivedARTPDFs/ART2000.pdf [hereinafter CDC].
62. See Jacobs, supra note 6, at 318; Recent Cases - Family Law - Unmarried
Couples - Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Holds that a Former Domestic
Partner Need Not Fulfill Promises to Support a Child Born After the Relationship Has
Dissolved T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1039, 1039 (2005) [hereinafter
Recent Cases].
63. See CDC, supra note 61, at 3.
64. See 1 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 605 (15th ed., 2007).
65. See CDC, supra note 61, at 3.
66. See 11 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 413 (15 th ed., 2007).
67. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
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of how the law treats children born to married couples through
assisted reproduction. Next, I examine how the law treats children
born to unmarried different- or same-sex couples through the use of
these same techniques.
Traditionally, the courts have looked to either a state's common
law or statutory version of the Uniform Parentage Act ("'JPA") to
determine parentage.68 In general, the gestational mother69 (unless
a surrogate mother is used)7° and her husband, are both presumed to
be the legal parents of the child born in their marriage.7 This pre-
sumption exists even when the parents use artificial insemination,
and the husband clearly has no biological link to the child. 2 In fact,
even if the couple marries after the birth of the child, the presump-
tion remains as long as the husband holds the child out as his own
according the statutory guidelines. 3 For those remaining states that
have not enacted legislation dealing with parentage occurring from
artificial insemination, courts have applied common law to create a
68. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. 4 (Supp. 2002); Jacobs, supra note 6, at 318.
The UPA was amended in 2002 but only seven states have adopted this version. Id.
Fourteen states have adopted the 1973 version of this Act. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B
U.L.A. 67 (Supp. 2008).
69. The gestational mother is the female who carries and gives birth to the child. See
Linda S. Anderson, Protecting Parent-Child Relationships: Determining Parental Rights
of Same-Sex Parents Consistently Despite Varying Recognition of Their Relationship, 5
PIERCE L. REV. 1, 7 n.32 (2006); New, supra note 3, at 803-04.
70. A surrogate mother is a female who may or may not have a genetic link to the
child, but does give birth to the child, and agrees to waive any presumed parental rights
as part of a contract with the people who intended the child to be created. See THE NEW
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 66 at 413; New, supra note 3, at 803-04.
71. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-30 (1989) (holding that a child
born of an adulterous affair was still the child of the husband, despite the wife's lover's
claim to fatherhood because, among other things, a long history of biological presumption
exists to preserve the family unit); Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige Ch. 139, 140-41 (N.Y. Ch.
1832) (discussing the "ancient" and "modern" presumptions of parentage between married
couples and rebutting those presumptions).
Furthermore, this presumption finds itself codified in many state statutes. See ALA.
CODE § 26-17-5(a)(1) (2008); ALASKA STAT. § 18.50.160(d) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-814(A)(1) (2008); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(a) (Deering 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 584-4(a)(1-3) (LexisNexis 2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5-5(a)(1) (LexisNexis 1999);
IND. CODEANN. §§ 31-14-7-1(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (West
2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1)-(3) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.55 (1)(a)-(c) (West 2008);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 210.822(1-3) (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(1) (2008).
72. Specifically, section 5 of the 1973 UPA states that if a wife is artificially inseminated
"under the supervision of a licensed physician," with her husband's consent, and with
sperm from someone other than the husband, the husband is still legally recognized at
the child's natural father. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 407 (1973). The 1973
UPA goes on to say that the sperm donor will not be recognized in law as the child's
natural father. Id. at § 5(b).
73. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(4)(a)(A)-(C), 9B U.LA. 17 (Supp. 2008).
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parental relationship where none existed biologically.74 Although this
presumption is not uniformly interpreted by the states, generally it
takes one of four forms: (1) a significant but not totally insurmount-
able irrefutable presumption; (2) a rebuttable presumption, if to do
so is in the child's best interests; (3) a rebuttable presumption that is
triggered at the time of divorce regardless of the length of the parent-
child relationship, or whether it would be in the best interests of the
child; and (4) a rebuttable presumption available to anyone who be-
lieves he is the parent to the child in question.75
What has emerged either by statute or common law is the cre-
ation of parenthood by focusing on intent over biology for husbands,76
and sometimes for wives.77 The legal parentage of married women
who use assisted reproduction is a little more complex. Because the
1973 UPA did not contemplate situations that would involve IVF, egg
donors, and surrogate mothers, and because the 2002 UPA, which did
address these issues, has only been adopted by seven states, some
confusion around this statutory presumption has arisen."0
It seems the marital presumption to paternity is also carried over
in same-sex relationships in which a couple resides in a state that
affords them the same rights and protections as married couples, if
not the right to marriage itself.79 In Massachusetts, one of only three'
states that permit couples of the same sex to marry, 1 the couple
74. See, e.g., K.S. v. G.S., 440 A.2d 64, 68-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (finding
husband the father of child born via artificial insemination because he had not
established that he had withdrawn his consent); Jackson v. Jackson, 739 N.E.2d 1203,
1205-06, 1209 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (creating a duty to support twins where husband had
orally consented to wife's artificial insemination).
75. Anderson, supra note 69, at 8.
76. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that husband was responsible for child support as he intended for the child to
be brought about).
77. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that when the
genetic mother differs from the gestational mother, intentionality will determine who
the natural mother is).
78. See In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-36, 1250, 1253, 1256 (N.J. 1988) (holding
surrogate contract illegal and the surrogate to be the natural mother, but finding the
husband of the other party to the surrogacy contract was the natural father, not the
husband of the surrogate mother).
79. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 967-69 (Vt. 2006).
80. Again, as this issue went to press, the passage of Proposition 8 in California has
called into question the ability of same-sex couples to marry in this state.
81. Christine Vestal, Ruling Could Ripple Across Country: States at Odds Over
California's Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, ABERDEEN AM. NEWS (California),
June 17, 2008, at Front Page, available at 2008 WLNR 11460097. But see Los Angeles:
No More Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages, supra note 59. See also Robert D. McFadden,
Gay Marriage Is Ruled Legal in Connecticut, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, at Al, available
at httpJ/www.nytimes.com/200810/11/nyregion/llmarriage.html?pagewanted=l (announc-
ing the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court striking down the state civil union
law and ruling same-sex couples can marry).
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must marry in order to protect this presumption.82 According to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in an advisory opinion to the
Senate, the State could not create civil unions while barring same-
sex marriage because it is unconstitutional, on due process and equal
protection grounds, to deny same-sex couples the opportunity to
marry, and thus treat them differently from married couples." This
suggests that a child created using artificial insemination born to a
same-sex married couple has two legally recognized parents from the
moment of conception, regardless of biological or gestational connec-
tion to the child.'
Currently, only Oregon,85 through registered domestic partner-
ship, Rhode Island and New York,8 through out-of-state recogni-
tion, and Vermont,87 New Jersey,88 and New Hampshire,89 through
civil unions, confer virtually all the rights, protections, and respon-
sibilities of married couples to same-sex couples.' Maine, Maryland,
Hawaii, Washington, and the District of Columbia also offer limited
rights and recognition to same-sex families.91 California's Domestic
82. See T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246, 1252-54 (Mass. 2004) (holding parenting
agreement was unenforceable and that parentage options in equity were not available
to create new obligations, only existing ones); see also Recent Cases, supra note 62, at
1039 (discussing impact of Massachusetts court decision recognizing only family relation-
ships that are expressly set out in a statute).
83. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). It
is highly likely that the same rule applies in California, where same-sex marriage took
effect on June 17, 2008. The California Supreme Court's opinion dealt with a comparable
issue on marriage as the Massachusetts opinion cited here. See In re Marriage Cases,
183 P.3d 384, 398 n.3 (Cal. 2008); Vestal, supra note 81. But see Los Angeles: No More
Licenses for Same-Sex Marriages, supra note 59.
84. See Williams, supra note 1, at 439 (citing Mark Strasser, When is a Parent Not
a Parent? On Doma, Civil Unions, and Presumptions of Parenthood, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
299, 299 (2001)).
85. Oregon's domestic partnership statute, the Oregon Family Fairness Act, took effect
on January 1, 2008. Oregon Family Fairness Act, ch. 99, §§ 1-9, OR. REV. STAT. ANN.,
§§ 107.615, 192.842, 205.320, 409.300, 432.005, 432.235, 432.405, 432.408, (2007).
86. New York's Governor Patterson ordered that all state agencies recognize same-
sex marriages performed out of state (or nation) in a memorandum publicized on May 29,
2008. Memorandum from David Nocenti, State of New York, Executive Chamber, to All
Agency Counsel (May 14, 2008). In addition, a county court ordered the recognition of a
same-sex marriage performed in Canada in Martinez v. Co. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740,
744 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008), appeal denied 10 N.Y.3d 856 (2008).
87. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2008).
88. Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 196 (N.J. 2006) (holding that the New Jersey legis-
lature would be required to amend or create laws in order to provide civil unions for same-
sex couples to enjoy the same rights and benefits of married couples).
89. New Hampshire's House Bill 437, An Act Permitting Same Gender Couples to
Enter Civil Unions and Have the Same Rights, Responsibilities, and Obligations as
Married Couples, took effect on January 1, 2008. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A: 1 to 457-
A:8 (2008).
90. This marital presumption has not been tested in Connecticut or California.
91. National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce, Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex
Couples in the U.S. (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue
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Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act specifically addresses the
parent-child relationship in domestic partnerships with the follow-
ing language:
The rights and obligations of registered domestic partners with
respect to a child of either of them shall be the same as those of
spouses. The rights and obligations of former or surviving regis-
tered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them
shall be the same as those of former or surviving spouses.92
When read together with California's fatherhood presumption stat-
ute on children created by artificial insemination born to a married
couple,93 children created in the same way and born to a registered
domestic partnership couple would have two legal parents under this
presumption. This protection appears to be afforded to the couple
without judicial intervention or a requirement that both parties have
a biological/gestational connection to the child.94 A similar result
seems likely to occur in civil union states.95
The Vermont legislature created analogous statutory language
to California's act, but in the context of civil unions. The Vermont
statute declares:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of
whom either becomes the natural parent during the term of the
civil union, shall be the same as those of a married couple, with
respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes the natural
parent during the marriage.9"
_maps/relationship-recognition_10_08.pdf; National Conference of State Legislatures,
Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and Domestic Partnerships (Oct. 2008), http://www
.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm.
92. CAL. FAm. CODE § 297.5(d) (Deering 2008). See also NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN
RIGHTS & EQUALITY CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP LAW: WHAT IT
MEANS FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILY 15 (2007), http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/
AB205.04.2007.pdfdocID=1264 [hereinafter NCLR & EQUALITY CA] (stating that the
presumption of parentage for children born of a registered domestic partnership will apply
before or after the act took effect January 2005. Under the Act, lesbian couples conceiving
via artificial insemination can have both their names included on the birth certificate at
birth, while gay couples in a registered domestic partnership using a surrogate will still
need a declaration of parentage by a court before partners can both be included on the birth
certificate, similar to heterosexual couples.). But see KM. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005)
(declining to rule on the parental presumption for children born to a same-sex couple who
had registered as a domestic partnership because they found parentage for both mothers
on other grounds). The status of parentage in domestic partnerships remains important
in California because same-sex couples will not necessarily choose to marry as they
engage in family formation.
93. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (Deering 2008).
94. See id.
95. See Anderson, supra note 69, at 5 (arguing the parental presumption would exist
in domestic partnership and civil union states under statute).
96. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(f) (2008).
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Likewise, when read in conjunction with Vermont's parentage stat-
ute, the non-biological parent in a civil union appears to have the
same legal status as the biological parent of the child created with
artificial insemination.9"
However, in Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins,98 the Vermont
Supreme Court used common law, not the statutory parental pre-
sumption of § 308(4), because it found the statute irrelevant to the
facts of the case.99 The court found that the legislature enacted the
statute to make bringing child support actions easier. °° Although
the court found the statute inapposite to this case because there was
nothing in the legislative history to suggest that it was intended to
mediate the parentage rights of children born to same-sex couples or
through reproductive technology,01 it did make clear that the stat-
ute could not be interpreted to mean biology is the only determinant
of parentage as the appellant argued.' 2
According to the court, such an interpretation would mean "the
husband of a wife who bears an artificially inseminated child cannot
be the father of that child, just like a civil union spouse cannot be a
parent to the child."'0 The court went on to state that the appellant's
argument would mean that a civil union partner of a biological parent
to an artificially inseminated child would have no parentage rights
unless she/he formally adopted the child.'0 4 Such an outcome would
undermine the intent of the legislature in creating legal equality
between civil unions and marriages.' 5
Noting the legislature's silence on the issue of parentage for
families who have used assisted reproductive technology, the court
stressed its preference for legislative guidance, but in its absence,
turned to common law to establish the presumption of parentage for
the non-biological parent in this case. 16 In concluding that the non-
biological mother was a parent to the child at issue in this case, the
court declared, "in accordance with the common law, the couple's legal
97. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(4) (2008) (stating in part that a rebuttable presumption
exists that a person is a natural parent to a child born to a couple who is legally married
at the time of the birth).
98. 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2130 (2007).
99. Id. at 969.
100. Id. at 966.
101. Id.
102. Id. Appellant's argument turned on the use of the words "presumed to be the
natural parent" in § 308(4) of the statute to suggest that natural exclusively meant
biological.
103. Id. at 967.
104. Id. at 968.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 968-69.
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union at the time of the child's birth is extremely persuasive evidence
of joint parentage."lOV Thus, while Vermont's statutory language was
not controlling, the court still found the same presumption of par-
enthood that exists for married couples was available to civil union
couples under the common law. 10 8 Whether this holds true in the re-
maining states with civil unions depends on the common law of those
states, the legislative intent of the statute creating a presumption,
and whether the legislature has spoken on the issue of parentage
through the use of assisted reproductive technology.109
Meanwhile, a New Jersey Superior Court determined that a child
conceived through artificial insemination and born to a same-sex
couple that had married in Canada and now resided in New Jersey
had the presumption of parentage under New Jersey's artificial
insemination statute."0 In this case, In re Child of K.R.,111 a couple
sought to establish legal parentage for the non-gestational mother
prior to the child's birth."2 In ruling that the state's artificial insem-
ination statute should apply to children born to a same-sex married
couple, the New Jersey court asserted that it was the intent of such
statutes to identify and provide the certainty of parentage for the
benefit of the child.
113
Although such a presumption does appear to exist for parents in
a domestic partnership, civil union, or marriage, this parentage pre-
sumption does not necessarily exist beyond the lines of the state that
created it." 4 Under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), however,
each state is free to determine whether it will recognize same-sex
107. Id. at 971.
108. It should be noted that this litigation was extremely complex because of a com-
peting case in Virginia. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330 (Va. Ct. App.
2006), subsequent appeal, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 158, (Va. Ct. App. April 17, 2007), affd,
661 S.E.2d 822 (Va. 2008). Despite Vermont's ruling that the non-biological mother
should have visitation with her daughter, I.M.J., it has taken over three years for her
to get regular visitation. See Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03Rddm, slip
op. at 6, 8 (Rutland Fam. Ct. June 15, 2007). While the biological mother appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 127 S. Ct. 2130 (2007), cert. denied,
2008 WL 3538468 (Oct 06, 2008), the Rutland Family Court ordered "parenting time" to
begin June 30,2007 with the non-biological mother. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03Rddm,
slip op. at 14.
109. Alabama, Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming have adopted the 2002 version of the UPA. Uniform Law Commissioners, A
Few Facts About the Uniform Parentage Act (Last Amended or Revised in 2002), http://
www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp. New Mexico has
recently considered adopting the 2002 version. Id.
110. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44(a) (West 2008); Joslin, supra note 1, at 702-03.
111. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 702 n.92 (stating case is on file with the author).
112. Id. at 703.
113. Id.
114. See 28 U.S.C. § 173C (2008).
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relationships in its own state or those legally created in other states,
where these relationships are treated like marriage."5 Over forty
states have amended their state constitutions or enacted statutes that
incorporate the language and intentions of DOMA, with most states
taking action in the 2004 and 2006 elections."' In fact, DOMA goes
even further and declares that no state is required to give effect to the
rights or claims arising from such relationships.
This suggests that under DOMA, states do not have to acknowl-
edge gay and lesbian fathers and mothers whose parentage arises
from a parental presumption of a legally recognized same-sex relation-
ship. The result is that as same-sex families move from non-DOMA
to DOMA states their family structure is altered and the non-birth
parent's parental status dissolves into that of a legal stranger."7 Cur-
rently, it is unclear how these "mini-DOMA '"" states will deal with
the legal parent-child relationships in these same-sex families." 9 As
no legislation currently exists to guide them, the courts must handle
the issue.
For example, let us return to Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins.2 °
The plaintiff, the biological mother, brought suit in Vermont in
November 2003 to dissolve a civil union with her partner and estab-
lish custody for their child, born of that union, using artificial insem-
ination.'2 ' The lower court ruled that she would get sole custody, but
the other mother was entitled to liberal visitation.'22 Almost imme-
diately, the plaintiff denied her former partner access to their child. 2'
Eight months later, the plaintiff took their daughter and filed suit
in her new state of residency, Virginia, a mini-DOMA state.'24 In
filing a Petition to Establish Parentage and for declaratory relief, the
biological mother's goal was to eliminate the parental rights of the
non-birth mother, and to have herself deemed the only legal parent.' 25
Filing the custody case in two jurisdictions with differing views about
the legitimacy of same-sex unions pitted DOMA against the Parental
115. 1 U.S.C.A. § 7 and § 173C constitute the Defense Against Marriage Act.
116. See 1 U.S.C. § 7; HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE MARRIAGE PROHIBITIONS
(Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.hrc.org/documents/marriage-prohibitions.pdf.
117. Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291.
118. See Strasser, supra note 84, at 305.
119. See id. at 305-06. Consequently, same-sex non-birth parents in states like
Massachusetts continue to adopt their children, despite the marital parentage pre-
sumption, in order to protect their legal status as parents as they across state lines.
120. 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006).
121. Id. at 956.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. See also National Gay and Lesbian Taskforce, supra note 91.
125. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 956-57.
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Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)'2 6 and the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).'27 Virginia could have
determined that it had proper jurisdiction to adjudicate this custody
claim and could have refused to recognize the non-birth mother as
a legal parent, granting sole parentage to the plaintiff denying the
defendant any access to the child.'28 In fact, the Virginia trial court
did just that. 129
On appeal, however, a three-judge panel reversed the lower
court's ruling, stating that the case raised the narrow issue of juris-
diction. 3 ° Under the PKPA the plaintiff had initially filed in Vermont
and, therefore, availed herself of that state's jurisdiction."'3 Virginia
ruled that Vermont's decision must be followed.'32 The Virginia Court
of Appeals declined to determine the "constitutionality" or "viability"
of its state DOMA statute, called the Marriage Affirmation Act,' 33
as it did not apply in this case, and if it did, the PKPA trumped it."M
In other words, the court did not wish to rule on the issue of whether,
under Virginia's DOMA statute, it was required to recognize the pa-
rental presumption created from a civil union. While Miller-Jenkins
may provide some guidance in competing custody actions, it offers
little insight on how to interpret the effect of mini-DOMA legislation
on the parental-child relationship formed through parental presump-
tions of legally recognized same-sex unions.
1. Assisted Reproduction for Unmarried or
Unrecognized Couples
For same-sex couples who live in states that do not allow them
to marry or do not recognize their union, or for couples who simply
choose not to marry, the parent-child relationship is completely vul-
nerable to the decisions of the biological parent and the state in
126. Id. at 957. The PKPA is federal legislation requiring that each state give full faith
and credit to the custody decision of another state that has proper jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A (1982). It was created to discourage parents from taking their children to other
states to engage in forum shopping in the hopes of achieving a custody ruling in their
favor. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 957-58.
127. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 957-58. The National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws enacted this act and it has been adopted by all states. UNIF.
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, prefatory note (1997). The act
determines which state has proper jurisdiction to adjudicate a custody claim. Id.
128. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d at 957.
129. Id.
130. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337-38 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
131. Id. at 338.
132. Id. at 337-38.
133. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2008).
134. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d at 337-38.
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which they reside. If the couple ends their relationship, the biological
parent may choose to sever all ties between the non-biological parent
and the child." 5 Often, the child has known this parent since birth.'36
If the biological parent does attempt to dissolve the relationship be-
tween the child and parent, the non-birth parent must rely on court
intervention to protect their parent-child relationship." 7 Until re-
cently, many courts chose to recognize only the biological parent as
the legal parent, treating the other as a legal stranger.'38
For example, in Kazmierazak v. Query,I3 9 the court held that the
former partner of a child's natural mother had no claim to custody
of the child she co-parented. 4 ° As a third party, she could not inter-
fere with the biological parent's fundamental right of privacy absent
a finding of significant harm to the child."' On this basis, the non-
biological mother could neither seek judicial relief on statutory nor
equitable grounds for custody or visitation.' Similar results have
occurred in other jurisdictions.'43
The results can be even more tragic for children who lose one
parent to death and then the other parent when courts deny custody
to the non-biological parent.14 In McGuffin v. Overton, two children
were born to an unmarried biological mother, Leigh McGuffin.'45 She
filed a paternity action against the father, Russell Overton, and he
stipulated that he was the biological father.'46 Moreover, Leigh began
raising the children together with her lesbian partner, Carol Porter,
when the children were five and three years of age, and continued
to do so until the time of McGuffin's death seven years later.147 Just
prior to her death, McGuffin executed a power of attorney delegating
all her parental powers to Porter. 4 ' She also executed a will assigning
135. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 1, at 689 (discussing Nancy S. v. Michelle G, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), where this occurred). This is also true for unmarried
heterosexual couples.
136. See, e.g., id. at 688-89.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. 736 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999), review denied, 760 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 2000).
140. Id. at 106, 110.
141. Id. at 109.
142. See id. at 110.
143. See, e.g., In re Visitation with C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 316-17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999);
In re Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27,27 (N.Y. 1991); Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APF01-
137 1997 WL 467327 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); In re Thompson v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d
913, 913-14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999); Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682,682 (Vt. 1997). But
see infra note 160 for court decisions finding otherwise.
144. See McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288, 289, 291-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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guardianship of the children to Porter, instead of the children's father,
Overton, because he had not established a relationship with his sons,
nor paid $20,000 in child support.'49 The court found, however, that
Porter had not been legally established as a guardian. 5 ° Therefore,
she had to be treated as a mere third party, despite raising the chil-
dren for the last seven years.'5 ' In fact, the court found that under
Michigan's custody statute, Porter did not have standing to bring a
custody claim.'52 The children then received a second trauma of losing
their other mother, Porter, when the court granted their biological
father custody. 5 '
The biological mother can also be vulnerable in these relation-
ships. A non-biological parent can walk away from a relationship re-
fusing to pay child support for a child that both partners planned to
raise together.' State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood illustrates this situa-
tion.'55 In this case a lesbian couple ended a four-and-a-half year
relationship before learning that one of the partners, Kelly, was preg-
nant.156 Tracey, her partner, had actively researched reproductive
options and participated in the artificial insemination process to get
Kelly pregnant.5 7 Once the child was born, however, the parties could
not establish an agreeable support and visitation plan for Tracey, and
she stopped paying support.'58 When Kelly applied for public assis-
tance, the state attempted to enforce a child support obligation on
Tracey, but the court ruled that Tracey was not a mother under the
state's Uniform Parentage Act and therefore could not order her to
pay support.
159
While the litigation discussed thus far explores the nature of the
parent-child relationship for non-biological parents at the time the
couple's relationship terminated, courts have also been disinclined
to recognize co-parenting agreements created at the time the couple
decides to engage in family formation. 160 A lesbian couple in In re
149. Id.
150. Id. at 291-92.
151. Id. at 289.
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id.
154. See State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 34 P.3d 887, 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 890.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id. at 890-91.
160. T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1244 (Mass. 2004). See A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660,
663-64 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing parent to enter into a custody agreement with a
third party subject to modification under a best interests standard); Rubano v. DiCenzo,
759 A.2d 959, 959 (R.I. 2000) (stating former partner's written agreement with the non-
biological mother allowing visitation rights with their child is enforceable). But see In re
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Bonfield had a committed fifteen-year relationship in which they
sought to have children via artificial insemination.'6 Because second-
parent adoption was not available in Ohio, the couple petitioned the
court to enter into a co-parenting agreement to protect the parental
rights of the non-biological mother.'62 The agreement's purpose was
"to 'confirm their commitment that they [both mothers] will ... con-
tinue to raise the children regardless of what happens to their rela-
tionship."6 3 The court found that the non-biological mother did not
fit the legal definition of either adoptive or natural mother, and conse-
quently, as a third party, she could not enter into a shared parenting
agreement with the children's biological mother.'64
More recently, however, courts have looked to common law or
equity to protect the parent-child relationship for children born by as-
sisted reproduction, using doctrines such as in loco parentis, de facto,
or psychological parent.'65 Under these doctrines, the non-biological
parent is viewed as a legal stranger who has functioned as the child's
parent affording him or her some sort of rights in relation to the child
even after the parent's relationship has terminated.'66 Unfortunately,
the interpretation of what rights are to be afforded non-biological
same-sex parents under these equitable doctrines is far from con-
sistent among the states.
167
States which have utilized these equitable doctrines place the
de facto parent into one of two categories. Courts in some states recog-
nize de facto parents as a special class of third party individuals seek-
ing access to a child, who thus have standing to petition for visitation
Custody of H.S.H.-K. v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419, 419, 437 (Wis. 1995) (holding the court
was not barred from using equitable powers to determine visitation for former same-sex
partner with parent-like relationship to the child).
161. See In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002).
162. Id. at 243-44.
163. Id. at 244.
164. Id. at 246-47.
165. Colorado, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin have all used these doctrines. National Center
for Lesbian Rights, Legal Recognition of LGBT Families, sec. IV. (2008), available at
http://www.nchrights.org/site/DocServer/Legal-Recognition-ofLLGBT-Families?docID=
2861.pdf. But see Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) (stating Maryland
will not recognize de facto parentage).
166. In order to establish de facto parenthood, the non-biological/non-legal parent has
to demonstrate that he or she has lived in the same household as the child long enough
to establish a relationship, helped raise the child, held himself/herself out as a parent,
and completed all this with the biological parent's consent. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546,
560-61 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (describing this four-part test as well as the types of legally-
created parents in equity); In re the Custody of H.S.H.-K. v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d 419,435-36
(Wis. 1995).
167. Donald K. Sherman, Child Custody and Visitation, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 691,
713-15 (2005).
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only."6 Courts in other states find that the de facto parent is entitled
to be viewed on par with non-custodial biological or adoptive parents
in seeking custody and visitation."9 A Washington State case appears
to go further and creates a third category of shared parentage for de
facto parents.17 ° In In re Parentage of L.B.,17 1 the court found that a
non-biological mother was a defacto parent, as she had co-raised the
child for six years, was referred to as "mama" by the child, and pub-
licly held herself out as the child's mother.7 2 In ruling that a de facto
parent has standing to petition the court, the court stated that de
facto parents stand "in legal parity with an otherwise legal parent,
whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.""'
Courts have also been willing to apply the doctrine of estoppel to
prevent non-biological parents who are psychological parents from
withholding financial support for the children they helped bring into
the world with their former partner. 7 4 Courts in some states have
also found that their statutory language permits psychological par-
ents to possess some of the same rights and obligations as biological
parents.' The California Supreme Court has used its state's statu-
tory language to determine parentage of non-biological parents. In
Elisa B. v. Superior Court,'76 the California Supreme Court found
that a lesbian partner who refused to pay child support for children
she planned for, held out as her own, lived with in the same house-
hold, and agreed to co-raise with her former partner, was also the
mother under the state's Uniform Parentage Act.'77 In so holding,
168. See, e.g., S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000), overruled by
Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008).
169. E.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891-92 (Mass. 1999) The trial court held
that "children born to parents who are not married to each other are to be treated in the
same manner as all other children." Id. at 889. The appellate court held that "It]he child
'is entitled to be protected from the trauma caused by the disruption' of his relationship
with [his non-biological mother.]" Id. at 894. See also King v. S.B., 837 N.E.2d 965, 966-
67 (Ind. 2005) (vacating the court of appeals ruling that a non-biological mother who
planned for and raised a child with her former partner was a legal parent, but transferring
the case back to the trial level to determine the custody of the child using a best interests
test because courts have authority to place a child with someone other than his/her
natural parent).
170. Williams, supra note 1, at 434-35.
171. 122 P.3d 161 (Wash. 2005).
172. Id. at 164, 178.
173. Id. at 177.
174. L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 877-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding that the
former lesbian partner, who was not the biological mother, was obligated to pay child
support under equitable doctrine).
175. See, e.g., Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975-76 (R.I. 2000).
176. 117 P.3d 660, 666-70 (Cal. 2005).
177. Id. at 666-70. In this case, after the non-biological mother refused to pay child
support, the biological mother had to seek financial assistance from the county. Id. at
662-63.
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the court determined that California's UPA should be read in a
gender-neutral fashion. I" s Using an intentionality test that courts
had applied to unmarried fathers in artificial insemination cases,
the court stated that the non-biological parent was also a mother
and therefore was obligated to financially support children that she
helped create.' 9
In a companion case to Elisa B., the California Supreme Court
ruled under the UPA that a child could have two parents of the same
sex with separate claims to motherhood in K.M. v. E.G.8 ° E.G. gave
birth to twins using in vitro fertilization with eggs donated by her
partner, K.M., and an anonymous sperm donor.' 8 ' K.M. signed a
parental claims waiver at the clinic where she donated her eggs."8 2
In addition, the couple decided to keep secret K.M.'s genetic connec-
tion to the children.' 83 Both mothers raised the children for the first
five years of their life, but after their relationship ended, E.G. sought
to sever the relationship between K.M. and the children." The court
held that E.G. was the legal mother under the UPA by virtue of giving
birth, but K.M. had a biological connection to the children and there-
fore was also their legal mother under the UPA.I'8
Finally, California offers some hope to same-sex couples who
seek parentage determinations before their child is born. In a third
companion case, Kristine H. v. Lisa R.,"8 Kristine became pregnant
through a known sperm donor."' At the time of her pregnancy, the
couple sought and got a judgment declaring Kristine as the biological
mother and Lisa as the child's other legal parent. 88 When their re-
lationship ended two years after the birth of the child, Kristine filed
a motion to "set aside the stipulated judgment."'8 9 The California
Supreme Court held that the biological mother was estopped from
challenging the order because she had stipulated to the judgment and
enjoyed the benefits of it during the child's first two years of life, but
did not rule on the validity of the judgment. 9 ° The court also noted
178. See id. at 666-67.
179. Id. at 665-70.
180. 117 P.3d 673, 681-82 (Cal. 2005).
181. Id. at 676, 683.
182. Id. at 676.
183. See id. at 676-77.
184. Id. at 676-77.
185. Id. at 680-82.
186. 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005).
187. Id. at 692.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 696.
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that it would be against public policy to not recognize both parent-
child relationships. 9' In addition, the court observed that Lisa might
be able to use the parental presumption under a gender-neutral read-
ing of the Family Code to establish parentage, using the intention-
ality test.
192
Although these statutorial interpretations and equitable doctrines
provide some relief for same-sex families residing in the minority of
states that allow for them, a number of questions surrounding the
non-biological parent's status to the child are still left unanswered.
For example, the non-biological parent is still cast into the role of a
legal stranger, as he or she petitions the court for de facto parental
recognition. 93 After overcoming the hurdle of meeting the legal re-
quirements of psychological parent,"M these second parents, even then,
do not obtain the rights of legal parenthood.'95 They may receive cus-
tody or visitation and child support obligations, depending on the cate-
gory that the state places the non-biological parent in (equal footing
versus special class of third parties), but in this quasi-parent role
the parent-child relationship is by no means secure.196
In this inferior position, it is unclear whether the child can
receive health insurance or survivor benefits from the psychological
parent.9 ' It is also uncertain whether the non-legal parent can make
medical or educational decisions for the child.' 98 Finally, if the legal
parent were to become incapacitated or die, would the non-biological
parent compete with other third parties for custody of the child? 99
If the child were to become seriously ill, could the non-legal parent
take time off from work to care for the child and be protected by the
state or federal Family Medical Leave Act? °°
In the majority of states, where these equitable options are not
available, the second parent has no opportunity to maintain a rela-
tionship with the child he or she has been parenting if the biological
191. Id.
192. Id. at 693.
193. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 685.
194. It is not clear how these equitable doctrines would apply if the couple ends a
relationship just prior to or just after the child is born, where enough time has not lapsed
to establish the parent-child bond between the non-biological partner and baby. Would
the non-legal parent who helped plan for the child have access to the child?
195. See Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 292.
196. Id. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 696.
197. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 690.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1994), remains a source of
confusion for a lot of same-sex families. For example, the federal government offers a
progressive policy where any individual who is an economic dependent of an employee
qualifies for purposes of taking leave to care for that individual.
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parent chooses to sever their tie.21 Not having a legally recognized
parent-child relationship can lead to outcomes significantly detrimen-
tal to both the child and parent.20 2 From a financial point of view the
child may not receive any support, may not have inheritance rights,
may not receive state or federal survivor benefits like Social Security,
retirement, or worker's compensation, and may not receive insurance
or tax benefits. 3 Furthermore, the child is left in a vulnerable position
if the biological parent dies or becomes disabled.2 4 The safety net
that a second parent can provide is not present. From an emotional
point of view, both parent and child will have the same grieving pro-
cess as losing a family member to death. With no way to maintain a
relationship with each other, each must act as if the parent or child
they have known since birth is dead.
With this level of ambiguity surrounding non-biological parent-
child relationships, second-parent adoption is recommended regard-
less of whether presumptions, equitable, or statutory relief exists.20 5
As stated previously, second-parent adoption is fraught with its own
issues. It requires court intervention and is available only in certain
states or counties. In addition to those issues discussed earlier, the
following cases illustrate further challenges that arise in using second-
parent adoption in assisted reproduction cases.
In In reAdoption ofA. W.,2"6 three children were born to a same-
sex couple using artificial insemination. 27 The biological mother with-
drew her consent to allow her partner to adopt the children, and the
court dismissed the petition.20 8 The non-biological mother lost all
contact with the children because the court ruled, under governing
statutes, that she had no standing to request visitation.2 9 Although
a couple may plan together to bring a child into the world and negoti-
ate who will be the biological mother or father with the understanding
that adoption will make the second parent a legal mother or father,
the non-biological parent finds him or herself at the mercy of the
biological parent if the relationship starts to disintegrate.
Sometimes, the non-biological mother's expression of a desire to
adopt the biological mother's children that the couple planned together
to create can actually destabilize a couple's relationship. For example,
201. Joslin, supra note 1, at 690.
202. See id. at 689-90.
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. See NCLR & EQUALITY CA, supra note 92, at 7.
206. 796 N.E.2d 729, 730 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
207. Id. at 730.
208. Id. at 731.
209. See id. at 735-36.
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in E.N.O. v. L.M.M.21 a lesbian couple had been in a thirteen-year
relationship before deciding to have a child using artificial insemi-
nation.21" ' The couple executed a co-parent agreement establishing
themselves as parents regardless of what happened to their relation-
ship.212 The couple then discussed second-parent adoption, and shortly
afterwards, the relationship ended.213 After years of litigation, the non-
biological mother established herself as a de facto parent, and received
visitation, but she did not have legal parentage over the child.214
Finally, in a third case, a biological mother attempted to undo the
second-parent adoption of her child by her former partner.215 In Erez
v. Starr, a biological mother gave birth to a child using artificial in-
semination.16 While the mother and her partner were residing in
Washington State, the non-biological mother used second-parent
adoption to become a legal parent of their daughter.217 'Three years
later, the family moved to North Carolina where [the adoptive mother]
became the primary caretaker," and after the relationship ended, the
biological mother moved to Georgia, leaving the children in the care
of the adoptive mother.218 During the custody dispute filed in North
Carolina, the biological mother argued that the Washington State
second-parent adoption decree could not be recognized in North
Carolina under its anti-marriage statute.219 The court held that the
Washington State adoption decree had to be recognized in North
Carolina. 2" Although the outcome of this case was favorable for the
adoptive mother, it nonetheless took significant amounts of time and
money litigating at the expense of the parent-child relationship. In
210. 711 N.E.2d 886, 889 (Mass. 1999).
211. Id. at 888.
212. Id. at 889.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 892-93. See also In re Elisa B., 117 P.3d 660, 662-63 (Cal. 2005) (discussing
how the non-biological mother, who also had a biological child through artificial in-
semination with her former partner Elisa B., had discussed with her former partner the
possibility of adopting each other's children, but that Elisa B. changed her mind because
she "had misgivings" about her former partner adopting the daughter she gave birth to);
V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 544 (N.J. 2000) (stating that two months after discussing
the non-biological parent adopting the couple's child, the biological mother terminated
the relationship).
215. See GLAD, supra note 30, at 8 (summarizing holding in Erez v. Starr, 97 CVD 64
(Durham Gen. Ct. 1997), appeal dismissed, COA99-1534 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)); Press
Release, National Center for Lesbian Rights, Lesbian Attempts to Use Anti-Gay Law to
Invalidate Second-Parent Adoption (Apr. 24, 2000), available at http://web.archive.org/
web/20010222004604/www.nclrights.orgreleasespr-nocar.htm.
216. See Press Release, supra note 215.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See GLAD, supra note 30, at 8.
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some cases, the length of time taken to resolve the case may be
longer than the time the parent and child spent living together as
a family.
221
Despite the significant concerns surrounding second-parent
adoption, it currently offers the best hope for securing the parental
rights of the non-biological parent or the non-primary adoptive par-
ent in countries or states that do not allow joint adoption by unmar-
ried or same-sex couples.222 However, for those couples living where
second-parent adoption is unavailable, unaffordable, unattainable
due to lack of knowledgeable counsel, undesirable (either because the
couple simply does not wish to use it or because the biological parent
will not consent) or for those who are unaware of the option, or who
are afraid to petition to the court for fear of a homophobic response,
the non-legal parent-child relationship is tenuous even for intact
relationships.2" Against this cultural and legal backdrop, the legally
fragile parent-child relationship may exact significant costs on same-
sex families, including destabilizing it. In the next section, using
empirical work, I explore the impact of this socio-legal climate on
same-sex couples' decisions to engage in family formation and par-
take in the very institutions that may act to undermine their family
structure.
II. THE STUDY: How SAME-SEX COUPLES RESPOND TO THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK AS THEY ENGAGE IN FAMILY FORMATION
The qualitative data used in this exploratory study came from
eighteen same-sex couples, comprised of eight gay couples and ten les-
bian couples located in the greater metropolitan Seattle area, who had
their first children together using assisted reproductive technology
or adoption.24 As the goal of the study was to examine how same-sex
couples navigate family formation in the current socio-legal climate,
other types of family forms, such as blended families with children
from previous hetero- or homosexual relationships, were excluded
from the sample.
221. See, e.g., Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951, 956 (Vt. 2006), appeal
after remand and decision, 949 A.2d 1082 (Vt. 2008).
222. Some jurisdictions will also allow declaratory judgments for parentage prior to
the birth of the child, thus allowing parental rights to be established without going through
a second-parent adoption process. See Casey Martin, Comment, Equal Opportunity
Adoption & Declaratory Judgments: Acting in a Child's Best Interest, 43 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 569, 583-4 (2003) (discussing California case law).
223. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 696.
224. As a part of the study participants were guaranteed confidentiality. As such, all
original source material related to the study remains on file with the author and through-
out this section names have been changed to protect confidentiality.
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All the respondents had at least a college degree, with half of the
respondents also possessing a graduate degree. The families clearly
fell into the upper middle class. Each couple had a household income
over $100,000. The age range for the respondents was between thirty-
five and forty-five, and the mean age of acquiring their first child was
37.5. Most couples had been in their current relationship for ten years.
All the respondents were white. The children ranged in age from four
months to seven years old, with a mean age of three years old.
Subjects were recruited using snowball sampling, using four
sources of contact to begin. The ethnographic work for the study was
carried out between January and June 2007, by conducting ninety-
minute interviews with one or both members of the couple.225 Specif-
ically, all eight interviews with the gay couples were conducted with
the primary caretaker, who was either a stay-at-home dad or worked
part-time outside the home. For five of the ten lesbian couples, the
interviews included both partners, and the remaining five were car-
ried out with the biological mother, who in all cases but one tended
either to be stay-at-home mothers or to work part-time outside the
home. All of the couples were raised in different-sex families. All but
two of the interviewees had been raised in other states and had moved
to Washington in adulthood.
The interviews used a narrative format in which I explored re-
spondents' perspectives on a number of issues, such as the decision
to create families, reproductive decision-making, engaging as families
with normative social networks and institutions, strategies to legally
and culturally preserve the families, and family dynamics in light of
these strategies. In all cases, the interviews were taped and immedi-
ately transcribed.226 Subjects were contacted for clarification on cer-
tain responses. As the children of the couples in this study were all
quite young, the accounts the couples provided give a contemporary
perspective of same-sex families managing to "do family" in this con-
stantly evolving socio-legal atmosphere.227
A. Expectations for Having Children
The lesbian couples in this study all stated that the idea of
having children was an expectation that grew out of their family of
origin.228 As girls, they had been socialized to believe that part of
225. On file with author.
226. On file with author.
227. See sources supra note 6.
228. Family of origin refers to the family into which they were born into or adopted
into and raised. See FAMILY THERAPY: MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 3 (Robert Jay Green &
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being a woman meant also being a mother. At some point in adult-
hood, they grappled with the intersecting ideas of motherhood and
their sexual orientation. For some, the two ideas could not co-exist.
But for others, as they developed social networks, it seemed possible
to be both a lesbian and a mother.
Every lesbian respondent discussed the decision to bring chil-
dren into their relationship as a process of negotiation. In about half
of the couples, one partner did not want to have children because of
concerns about how the child would be treated by society at large.
Others articulated a lack of desire to have children because of a long-
held belief that gay and lesbian individuals could not have children
in our contemporary society. In other words, not having children was
simply one of many costs of possessing their particular sexual orien-
tation. Diane229 put it this way, with her partner nodding her head
vigorously in agreement:
There are just so many brick walls that feel about ten inches
thick. First you have to get your parents on board with the con-
cept. They might have accepted your sexual identity, but having
kids was another matter. Then, you have to think about cost.
These things don't occur by accident. You have to talk to doctors
and lawyers, judges. And then there's your partner. Because you
don't have marriage, you don't have that glue. So, when you bring
the child into the relationship, with so much against you, how are
you going to do this together? Are you both always going to be
there? Financially and emotionally?
For couples in which one partner was disinclined to have children
because of a concern that any potential children would encounter a
homophobic world, the key factor that caused them to change their
mind was age. As Amy states:
I grew older and two things happened. All of a sudden I became
more hopeful that it was possible to live in a world in which les-
bians could have children and they'd be treated okay. I started
seeing our [lesbian] friends having kids and that it was going
really well for them [in Seattle]. The other thing was my age. My
biological clock was ticking, and I realized that the decision to not
have kids would soon be final. I mean I couldn't change my mind
at a certain point.
James L. Framo, eds., 4th prtg. 1986) (defining "family of origin" as the "nuclear family
in which the adult individual was raised").
229. Again, all subjects' names have been changed to maintain confidentiality.
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Most of the women in this study had been raised in areas where they
observed both overt and covert hostility towards homosexuals. After
living in the Seattle area for some time, they felt Seattle was a more
tolerant area, and in some cases, embracing of same-sex families.
For the other couples in which a partner did not feel an urge to
have children, the turn around in their position came when a part-
ner threatened to end the relationship. Kara stated:
My partner really wanted to have children and I knew that, but
I wasn't sure how long our relationship was going to last in the
beginning. Then, as we started talking commitment ceremonies,
she said she didn't think she could stay in the relationship if we
didn't have children. Of course, the irony in all this is that I am
the one who gave birth! Naturally, I've completely changed my
mind about having kids.
In these cases, the decision to have children was part of the process
of deciding to commit to each other as a family unit.
All of the men in the study stated that as they approached adult-
hood they had no expectation of having a long-term partner, much
less children. Peter sums up the respondents well when he says:
Once I came out to my family, there was no talk of me having kids
one day. It was all about what a great uncle I would be. And I am.
I'm the favorite uncle. But then there was also the issue of AIDS.
Back then, men were dying of AIDS. The question was would we
even be alive? It wasn't until I actually saw gay families did I
think it was possible for me.
The different factors the subjects prioritized in their responses re-
flect the larger cultural and social influences experienced during their
coming of age. Most of these respondents came of age during the
1980's, when the AIDs epidemic led to increased homophobic re-
sponses by the world at large.23 ° As they moved into their reproduc-
tive years, the first wave of gay and lesbian family formation had
been well established.2"' Gay fathers and lesbian mothers were win-
ning custody of their children from previous marriages and living
with their same-sex partners."' In addition, the second wave, known
as the "gayby" boom,233 was underway by the mid 1990's, offering a
230. See Erik F. Strommen, Hidden Branches and Growing Pains: Homosexuality and
the Family Tree, in HOMOSEXUALITY AND FAMILY RELATIONS, supra note 5, at 11.
231. See Stacey, supra note 6, at 146-49.
232. See id.; Polikoff, supra note 3, at 461-65, 533-42.
233. Suzanne Kemmer, Rice University, The Rice University Neologisms Database,
http://neologisms.rice.edulindex.php?a=srch&d=I&id_srch=599ale8df51a3b9f78cb676
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model to follow. It seems that the initial factors weighed in deciding
to have children were significantly more informed by culture than
the law.
1. What Path the Stork Will Take
All of the lesbian couples in the study chose to use artificial in-
semination from an anonymous sperm donor to conceive a child. The
couples chose this method over adoption because they wanted to have
some genetic history to share with their offspring. All but two of the
couples planned to alternate childbearing so each mother could have
a genetic connection with their children. But in all cases, the biological
mother of the first child became the biological mother to all the chil-
dren in the family. This situation occurred because the non-biological
mother became the primary breadwinner after the first child was
born, and her career was on a stronger trajectory than the biological
mother's career. The couple felt it was better not to disrupt the non-
biological mother's career path.
The decision as to who would conceive a child came down to three
factors: age, genetics and career. In the cases of the couples who never
intended to alternate childbearing, the couples decided that given the
age difference between them, it was best to have the younger women
conceive the children. The second factor, genes, led to an assessment
of family history, which influenced who would be genetically connected
to the child. Those women who came from families with physical or
mental health risks deferred to their partners who had healthier
family backgrounds. Finally, the nature of employment dictated who
was in a better position to give birth to a child and take family leave.
There were clear distinctions in terms of cultural tolerance for preg-
nant women, as well as lesbian pregnant women, and mothers at the
workplace. Furthermore, the realistic possibility of maintaining a
particular career after the birth of the child determined who was
better placed to become pregnant. Lynn observed:
We both had really good benefits at work, but Kate was in resi-
dency at the time we wanted to get pregnant. There was no way for
her to stay on track with being a doctor, if she was pregnant dur-
ing a residency or when she was just starting out, so we thought
she should go second. On the other hand, I worked in an office
with tons of moms. There was just way more flexibility for me.
8c186df708&il-en&p=l (last visited Nov. 4, 2008). This term was first used in CURVE
magazine on August 1, 1997, to observe the demographic trend of gay and lesbian couples
having babies. Katie Sanborn, Baby Boom or Bust, CURVE, August 1997, at 24.
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And then when we decided we wanted another one, Kate's career
was really taking off and it just didn't make sense to interrupt
that, when it had worked so well for me the first time.
The reasoning articulated above represents the paradox in which les-
bian couples must organize their reproductive lives. On the one hand,
the decision of when to become pregnant, and the potential sacrifices
to a career that it may cause, is shared by all women, but for the
women in this study, there is an additional factor in the calculus. In
Washington State, the other mother is not legally recognized as a
mother without judicial intervention, using second-parent adoption,'
which cannot occur until some time after the birth of the child. There-
fore, unlike heterosexual couples who can rely on both partners to
assess their access to health insurance and the protections of the
state and federal Family Medical Leave Act, lesbian couples must
appraise their career situations individually to determine whether
having a child makes sense.235
Finally, the decision to use an anonymous sperm donor, as op-
posed to someone the couple knew, was to have clearly defined bound-
aries about who the family was and could ever be. Jenna noted:
We had heard stories about couples who had used friend's sperm,
and he had promised not to want to establish a relationship with
the child. But then, after the baby arrived, he wanted to be part
of her life. He insisted and even went to court. It was a nightmare.
We wanted no part of that. Our eldest daughter knows how babies
are made and she asks where her dad is. We make it very clear:
we went to a sperm shop and bought it. We tell her some people
have a mommy and a daddy, but you don't. You are very lucky
because you have two mommies.
This statement reflects a consistent theme expressed by all the
women in the study. They wanted a cohesive family unit that could
not be challenged culturally or legally. By acknowledging the sperm
donor, others might claim their daughter really did have a dad; in
addition, the sperm donor might claim parental rights in court.
On the other hand, one couple did try using a known sperm
donor. They wanted the child to have a "father-like" figure in his or
her life, but they also wanted to make it clear that they would be the
parents. The donor would have occasional and flexible visitation.
Ultimately, when the couple brought the legal documents to the donor
234. In Washington, second-parent adoption appears to be available only in certain
counties and with particular judges based on the conducted interviews.
235. See Joslin, supra note 1, at 690.
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to sign, he decided against participating because he felt that he would
want to be a parent to the child. Diane explains why they then chose
to use an anonymous donor:
When he backed out at the eleventh and a half-hour, it was dev-
astating. It was like having a miscarriage. We just couldn't believe
it, and we couldn't talk about having a child for a whole year.
During that year, we had time to think, and realized it would just
never work having a known sperm donor understand that they
could be the uncle or friend, but not the dad.
By using a fertility clinic, they had legally and culturally eliminated
the role of "father" in their family and protected their particular
family structure from intrusion.
All of the gay couples in the study, with the exception of one,
chose to use international adoption combined with a domestic second-
parent adoption."' Their reason for using adoption, as opposed to a
surrogate mother, mirrored the same concerns as the lesbian cou-
ples in using an anonymous sperm donor. First, the couples thought
that international adoption would have a level of finality with the
geographic distance that they were not sure would be possible with
domestic adoptions. Jay expressed his trepidation this way:
We wanted to make sure that there would be no question that
we were the parents. So we ruled out surrogacy right away. First,
we weren't even sure it was legal in this state. And even if we
went to another state, what if she changed her mind? We thought
there's no way we'd win. Then, when we thought domestic adop-
tion, we were worried about the same thing. What if the mom
found out we were gay. Could she change her mind and take the
child back? Would the state undo our adoption?
It was important to the couples to clearly establish that they were
parents. Perhaps most importantly, the couples wanted to ensure
that no one could step in and reverse the family arrangement they
had created.
For the one couple who chose to use a surrogate mother, they
felt the same desire as the lesbian families - to have some genetic
connection to their child. In this case, they both contributed sperm
to be used for in vitro fertilization so that each of them would be genet-
ically connected to one of the twins born to them. They had less fear
than the other couples in using a surrogate after carefully researching
236. The respondents also mentioned that they preferred an international adoption
because they thought it would be faster than a domestic adoption.
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and locating a state with geographical distance from their own that
would allow for joint adoption by a gay couple and would enforce sur-
rogacy contracts. Furthermore, they used an egg donor, so that the
gestational mother would have no biological connection to their chil-
dren. From their point of view, they had eliminated the role of mother
as being a clearly defined person and cemented their role as the only
parents to the children by using this type of reproductive technology.
With both the lesbian and gay couples, considerable research
went into establishing the best strategy to create a family. The pri-
ority for all couples was to ensure the legal integrity of their family
unit. Cultural influences played less of a role at this stage, although
it was important not to have an identifiable mother donor or father
donor who others could point to as being the "true" parent to the child.
More so, the couples were concerned over legal challenges that could
disrupt their family relationship. Biological connections clearly take
a backseat to the social relationships developed and carried out by
the couple 'doing family.' The desire to draw firm boundaries around
their family units may have been influenced by the increasing num-
ber of states that enacted legislation or amendments banning gay
marriage in the elections of 2004 and 2006.237 In the face of mount-
ing hostility towards legal recognition of their partnership, the cou-
ples felt an urgent desire to protect their parent-child relationships.
It is interesting to note that despite the cultural opposition to same-
sex relationships, these couples were not dissuaded from growing
their families.
B. Strategies to Legally Preserve the Family and Couples'
Understanding of What They Have Achieved
All of the couples engaged the services of legal counsel to assist
them in maximizing both party's legal standing as parent. Every at-
torney advised them to use second-parent adoption.238 The couples
described the process as nerve-racking and, in some cases, fear in-
ducing. Both the gay and lesbian couples expressed two key themes
regarding the process. It became obvious to everyone as they began
to investigate the process of second-parent adoption, first by talking
with friends who had navigated the procedure already, and then in
discussing it with an attorney, that a back door network had to be
employed. Jake explains:
237. See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, supra note 116. See also Gilmore v. Sec'y of the
Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 811-15 (11th Cir. 2004) (reiterating
in 2004 that there is no fundamental right to adopt children).
238. Almost all of the couples had also created wills, established power of attorney,
and chosen guardians for their children.
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Our friends told us about the particular attorney who was gay
friendly and knew how to do these adoptions and knew the judges
to go to who would approve our adoption. Then when we talked
to the attorney, we learned that we would have to have evalua-
tions and home studies. Oh my god, we thought, how would we get
through this! But of course, there are the special social workers
who know how to write reports without mentioning the words
'gay couple'. Everything seemed to be in code.
The couples also felt that what they were engaging in was clearly not
a mainstream legal procedure. The couples observed that a new cate-
gory of adoption needed to be created for them and that only particu-
lar judges would allow their petition. In some cases, the attorneys had
to confirm that the judge would allow the petition before bringing it
to that court. Finally, only certain lawyers knew how to do the peti-
tions. Even the way the attorneys counseled them made them ques-
tion the legitimacy of what they were trying to do. Jo put it this way:
We've been together for ten years. We felt it was important for our
relationship to bring a child into it. I gave birth to our daughter,
and now our family is complete and then the attorney kept saying
to me, 'Do you understand what you are giving up. You are giving
up half your parental rights forever.' And I kept saying, 'I am not
losing anything. Our daughter is gaining another parent!'
The experience left the couples questioning what they had actu-
ally achieved by engaging in the second-parent adoption process.
Many of the couples, and in particular, the second-parent adoptive
parents, expressed the feeling that they held secondary cultural and
legal status. A frequent refrain was if anything were to happen, would
the courts really recognize the non-biological parent as a parent? In
this quote, Jay expresses his concern were he and his partner to end
their relationship:
Well, God forbid we have a custody battle. [Robert] went to
Guatemala. His name is listed as the parent. The kids have his
last name. I've been taking care of them for the last six years,
but I wouldn't get custody. I only did the second-parent adoption
in the U.S.
Jo explained that because she and her partner feared that her par-
ents would try to seek custody of their child if anything were to hap-
pen to Jo, the biological mother, she made it clear in her will that her
partner would be the legal guardian, in addition to also getting a
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second-parent adoption. In contemplating what would happen if their
relationship ended, however, Jo tells her partner, "if we separated,
I'd just take that part [the desire to have her partner be guardian to
their child] out of the will." After hesitating, some awkward silence,
and a look of confusion on her partner's face, she continues: "Oh wait.
Even if I did that, you're still the parent."
Such observations reflect the confusion of most of the parents
in the study. First, second-parent adoptions may not have the legal
finality of other adoptions, and second, a second parent who adopts
holds an inferior position to that of the first adoptive parent or bio-
logical parent.239
Although each couple had approached their reproductive deci-
sions in such a way as to maximize the stability of their family and
protect it from outside legal and cultural challenges, not all partners
were sure they had maximized stability from within, even after engag-
ing the legal system. In other words, they feared their partner could
lay greater claim to the child were their relationship to end, relying on
the same laws used to create their parental status in the first place.
The lack of confidence around the second-parent adoption tool
was also expressed in the family's fear of moving, traveling to other
states, or in some cases, within states. Couples felt real restrictions
about where they could live and work, or even feel confident travel-
ing, because the law around second-parent adoption appeared to them
to vary so much. A recurrent question or observation in almost all
of the interviews was: If we ever moved, would our legal status as
parents be recognized? Andy remarked, "I mean who wants to go to
Idaho? But I do worry that all the legal protections we went through
are meaningless in other states." Peter noted that "[m]y parents live
in Florida. We could never move to be closer to them. We would not
be recognized as a family legally." Emma echoed a similar sentiment
upon learning that her friend's second-parent adoption was denied:
My first thought was we're naive. It never occurred to us that we
couldn't go somewhere else and be fine. Then I thought, oh well,
I guess we're no longer going to Idaho. But then it hit me, every
time we travel or think about jobs, we have to wonder what will
that state do with our family status? If we need to go to a hospital,
will we both get to see the baby? Both make the medical decisions?
We live in a bubble, here in Seattle.
Due to their perceptions that the law is not uniformly in agree-
ment about second-parent adoption, the respondents felt that this
239. Tiffany L. Palmer, Family Matters: Establishing Legal Parental Rights for Same-
Sex Parents and Their Children, 30 HuM. RTS. 9, 10 (2003).
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unevenness, reflected in the larger culture, seeped into their family
dynamics. For example, the parents noted that the children in their
families had picked up on the issues of parental legitimacy. One bio-
logical mom said that she and her partner had to work very hard to
establish the relationship between their seven-year-old daughter
and the non-biological mother. She acknowledged: "[Our daughter]
doesn't listen to [the non-biological] mother, and will say, 'I don't have
to do what you tell me. You're not my real Mommy. You just adopted
me."
C. The Impact of Power Differences
In the families in this study, two kinds of power dynamics seem
to emerge: the economic and the biological. The non-biological mother
in the couples tended to be the primary breadwinner, and therefore,
held more economic power in the relationship. On the other hand, the
biological mother held a greater parental legitimacy claim due to her
biological connection to the children, and because she tended to be ful-
filling gendered normative expectations by also being the primary
caretaker. As Kate, a non-biological mother, ruefully observed:
I feel like I am always defending my position. Whether it's with
the kids, other families, teachers at school or the doctor's office,
I am not with them as much, so these people [teachers, other
parents, doctors] already know [their daughter] has a Mom.
The question is who am I? The other day we were flying, and I
thought, I better bring the adoption decree just in case.
This type of power dynamic was not articulated as clearly
amongst gay couples, perhaps because both parents have adopted
the children. The dads, who were parents by virtue of second-parent
adoption, however, did state they were glad to be in the primary care-
taker role where more people knew them as the dad. On the other
hand, these dads expressed more vulnerability in the parent-child
relationship if the relationship with their partner terminated. Not
only were they economically exposed because they were the stay-at-
home dads, but they also felt they had less legitimacy in the eyes of
the law because they were not the first parent to adopt. Dan wryly
put it this way: 'The name says it all. Second. Parent. Adoption."
The results of these quotations are troubling because they indi-
cate that even though these couples have spent thousands of dollars
to engage the legal system, and in particular to seek the advice of
counsel, they are left with a feeling of uncertainty about the paren-
tal status of both adult family members.
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The law's lack of uniformity in recognizing same-sex families is
a reflection of some states' unwillingness to do so, but also acts as a
reinforcement of those states' cultural attitudes about this type of
family formation. In so doing, social structures, like the legal system,
actually continue to undermine same-sex families. Several of the cou-
ples expressed frustration at school and medical forms that do not
reflect their family structure; others lamented lack of access to var-
ious employment and governmental benefits, and were also concerned
by the day-to-day interactions with others. Amy commented on how
her family lives on a street filled with kids and everyone is very
friendly, but the other families seem to be friends:
If we're out playing, everyone will come and play. Our kids don't
get excluded. But we don't get invited to other people's houses in
the neighborhood. Oh sure, the parents say hi, but then they
walk across our lawn to the other neighbors and hang out and
have coffee. I can't help wondering, is it that they don't like us,
or they don't like our type of family. I mean it's not the end of the
world; we have a really large network of gay families we hang
with. But still ....
Jenna's concern was more intense. Soon after giving birth to her
daughter, she and her partner moved to another state. After living
in their new neighborhood for a few months, some people tried to
break into their house at night. Jenna described her feelings about
the incident:
For the first time ever, I thought, did someone do this randomly,
or did they do it to hurt our family because they don't agree with
our lifestyle? I would have never had those thoughts in Seattle.
Now we're moving again and I worry in this new state, I wonder
will people like us? Then I tell myself what's not to like about us?
Others expressed concern about the impact of their family structure
on their extended family. A lot of the respondents in the study had
moved from other locations that were more hostile to gay and lesbian
families, and they still had relatives in these locations. Some couples
said their parents could only talk to a few close friends about their
son's or daughter's family structures. Amy noted most tragically:
If [she and her partner] were to die, our kids would go to my
brother and sister-in-law in North Carolina. My biggest fear is
that my partner [the non-biological mother] would not be remem-
bered. Not because of my brother, but because of the community.
They just couldn't talk about having two mommies.
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This legal insecurity permeates many of their institutional and rela-
tional interactions. It takes a toll on their family structure, as seen
here:
Respondent: I hope this thing holds up.
Interviewer: What? The adoption or your relationship?
Respondent: Both.
In the end, these families' interactions with and perceptions of the
law seem to create an imprisoned family. Despite the extremely high
level of education of the sample, the availability of resources to hire
appropriate counsel and the engagement of the legal system to cre-
ate whatever legal protections they could to solidify their family unit,
a sense of diffidence surrounded what exactly they had achieved. The
effect appears to create a captive family on two levels.
Psychologically, the parent who second-parent adopts does not
hold the same power in the family because family members perceive
their status to be inferior both culturally and legally to that of the
biological or first adoptive parent.24 ° This inequality can permeate not
only the interactions within the family, but can also be reinforced by
interactions in other social institutions. The result can be destabi-
lizing if the parent feels like his or her parental legitimacy is being
questioned, or more crucially, could be questioned if the relationship
ended. This gives incredible power to one parent. While it may never
be overtly used, it could have a corrosive effect on an intact family re-
lationship in subtle ways. Emotionally, the parent with the perceived
inferior position may not assert himself or herself either with the
child or their partner in regard to their children for fear of how it
will be received. In essence, the other family members could hold
them emotionally hostage.
Geographically, the entire family is held captive when the par-
ents are not confident they will be treated as a legitimate family re-
gardless of where they live or travel.24' When families are literally
undone by simply entering a state's border, it is difficult to imagine
a more effective way of undermining this type of family formation.
As noted above, these real and perceived barriers exact a toll on the
family's ability to exist to the fullest extent. Whereas different-sex
240. It should be noted that gay fathers who were the second-parent adopters gar-
nered more parental legitimacy by choosing to be the primary caretaker. As they were
more present in the social institutions where parent and child interact, their role as
father was taken for granted. However, by stepping out of the job market, they traded
economic power for increased cultural parental power. This did not necessarily allay their
fears regarding legal parental power.
241. See Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291-93.
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families take the right to travel for granted, same-sex families must
weigh the risks against the benefits.242 These families are bound to
the states that are willing to acknowledge them.243
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this study reflect the state of ambiguity that exists
culturally and legally in same-sex families. The families in this study
demonstrate that they must still negotiate both cultural resistance
and legal inconsistencies as they engage in family formation. Perhaps
most troubling, however, is the power differential that emerges from
the uncertainty of the law. At once, the law that has been a shield of
protection can be wielded as a weapon of destruction. First-adopter
and biological parents find themselves in a powerful position to dis-
mantle parent-child relationships.244
Although the courts and legislatures have made some gains in
preserving the parent-child relationship after a same-sex couple rela-
tionship dissolves, the state has an interest in preserving all family
units.245 The law must do more to support intact family units so a
child can enjoy the benefits of both parents uniformly. Here are some
of my recommendations.
First, attorneys currently assisting same-sex couples in family
formation as they navigate the legal and social maze of establishing
parenthood can take immediate action by considering the nature of
how they currently counsel their clients. More family law attorneys
should educate themselves about the current state of the law, not
only within the state they practice, but all states. This education
would serve two purposes: more attorneys would be available to as-
sist these families, and more attorneys would provide better advice
to these families.
As this research demonstrates, when highly educated and well-
resourced same-sex families are still unclear about the status of
their parenthood even after engaging the legal system, lawyers are
doing a disservice to their clients.24 Family law attorneys should be
242. See Chen, supra note 3, at 195.
243. See id.
244. One of the subjects of this study, who happened to be a biological mother, reflected
uncomfortably, on her fantasy of attempting to undo the parent-child relationship between
her partner and their children. Despite watching the pain of a friend who was a second-
parent adoptive mother having to fight to get shared custody of her children, she still felt
the urge to think along those lines when she had strong discord with her partner.
245. See Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291-93.
246. These results are somewhat consistent with a national poll conducted by Hunter
College at The City University of New York. In this poll, only 38% of respondents could
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working to ensure that both parents feel confident about their re-
lationship with their children. Instead, the nature of the legal rhet-
oric used in second-parent adoptions, the clearest way in which both
partners can establish parental rights, serves only to undermine the
equality of each parent in his or her relationship to the child. By fram-
ing second-parent adoptions as a giving-up of rights by the biological
parent, instead of a gaining of rights by the non-biological or non-first
adopter in international adoptions, attorneys only reinforce the idea
one parent is legally and socially lesser than the other.24 When few
lawyers understand the nature of the practice and have to strategize
about which judges or courts in which to file these petitions, same-
sex families receive the message that their family is legally and cul-
turally deviant.
The clearest way to solve the problem is eliminate the need for
second-parent adoption.24 The use of second-parent adoption emerged
answer correctly all four questions about same sex marriage at the state and federal
level, LGB military service, and LGB employment bias. PATRICK J. EGAN ET. AL., FINDINGS
FROM THE HUNTER COLLEGE POLL OF LESBIAN, GAYS AND BISEXUALS: NEW DISCOVERIES
ABOUT IDENTITY, POLITICAL ATTITUDES, AND CIviC ENGAGEMENT 23-24 (2008), available
at http://www.hrc.org/documents/HunterCollege-Report.pdf. Interestingly, respondents
considered highly informed ranked parental rights and familial federal benefits as the two
most important policy issues, compared to those considered less informed who ranked these
issues third and fourth. Id. at 24, 25 fig.7. Similarly, younger members of the poll priori-
tized parental and adoption rights and marriage rights over other policy issues. Id. at
25, 26 fig.8.
247. At the time a couple engages the medical or legal system to begin family planning,
either through artificial reproduction or adoption, it is incumbent upon these professionals
to provide effective counseling that makes clear to both prospective parents that they
will both be considered parents by the child they choose to bring into their family. In that
regard, the law should be used to support the family relationship. Furthermore, lawyers
should counsel first adopters and/or biological parents that the law should not be used
to attempt to terminate the parental relationship between the second parent and child
just because the former parent no longer wishes to be in a relationship with the latter
parent. As long as attorneys are willing to take on high profile cases that challenge the
parental status of a person who in every sense has acted as the parent to his or her child,
the law is held out as a weapon that undermines the very relationships that, as a matter
of policy, it should be preserving. For every step forward, culturally and legally, made
with cases like Miller-Jenkins, we move a step backward with cases like Janice M v.
Margaret K. These are both cases litigated this year.
248. In eliminating the need for second-parent adoption and instead creating narrowly
rebuttable presumptions at the time the child is acquired by either the first adopter or
through birth, the three main points of litigation would largely disappear: (1) parents
would no longer challenge the legitimacy of their partner's parental status; (2) non-
biological or non-adopter second parents could not walk away from the parental respon-
sibility they took on at the time they agreed to bring a child into the family; and (3) sperm
donors could neither claim parenthood nor be used to undermine the parental status of
the biological parent's partner. Perhaps most importantly, these presumptions would
exist outside of marriage, so same-sex couples would not have to rely on this institution
as the only possible way of getting their family legally and culturally recognized.
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from the creative use of step-parent adoption.249 However, the use
of second-parent adoption has created an unwanted legacy of un-
equal parenting within some same-sex families. States developed
step-parent adoption to support the positive policy goal of providing
children with two parents.2 11 While second-parent adoption does the
same for adoption and artificial insemination cases, the analogy ends
there.251 Step-parent adoption is based on the theory that another
person lays greater claim to the child than the step-parent. Through
consent or waiver and the desire of the step-parent's partner, a step-
parent may legally replace another parent who consents to termi-
nate his or her parental rights, or has waived them, or had them
terminated through judicial action while the step-parent's partner
maintains his or her parental rights.211 On the other hand, same-sex
couples start on equal footing as they plan to bring children into their
family. The non-biological parent or the parent who does not adopt
is not replacing another parent who had greater legal claim. One's
biological or first adopter status should not serve as a legal basis on
which to give one partner greater protections or power than the other,
even temporarily.
Legislatures should allow couples who have planned together for
a child, worked together to bring a child into the world, and intend
to parent the child together to apply for a parentage declaration. 3
This declaration would require no judicial intervention, but rather the
application would be completed by both parents, thereby establish-
ing their intentions to parent the child prior to the birth of the child.
In assisted reproduction cases, the application could occur at the time
the couple selects a donor and just prior to the medically procedural
attempts at conception. 4 Most importantly, no adoption would be
249. Martin, supra note 222, at 572. See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 27-8.
250. See Palmer, supra note 239, at 10.
251. See Shapiro, supra note 49, at 27.
252. Id.
253. Under the 2002 version of the Uniform Parentage Act, a father-child relationship
is established when a man has consented to the use of assisted reproduction and a child
is born, regardless of the marital status of the parents. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 201(b)(5),
202, 9B U.L.A. 309-10 (2001) (amended 2002).
254. Currently, the District of Columbia allows for the status of de facto parent for the
partner of the person who has adopted a child. Safe and Stable Homes for Children and
Youth Amendment Act of 2007, D.C. CODE §§ 16-801 to -813 (2008) (amending D.C. CODE
tits. 16, 21 (1981)), available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/00001/
20070629100846.pdf. The same should hold true for artificial insemination cases; the
District of Columbia currently has draft legislation to this effect. Domestic Partnership
Judicial Determination of Parentage Act of 2008, D.C. COUNCIL B17-0328, (amending
D.C. CODE § 16-909(e), (f)), available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/images/
00001/20080417171813.pdf.
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required; once parental responsibility is established, upon the birth
of the child, the non-biological parent's status should be presumed
and rebuttable under very limited circumstances.255
Such an option should be available to same-sex couples who cur-
rently cannot or simply do not wish to have state recognition of their
relationship,256 but do wish to protect the parent-child relationships
that they are creating using assisted reproduction. A procedure in
which both parents-to-be are legally recognized prior to the birth of
the child protects the state, the child and the parents. As noted from
the cases discussed earlier, future parents can find themselves vul-
nerable in two ways as they wait for the impending birth of their
child without the legal status of parenthood. First, the biologically-
connected parent may end the relationship prior to the birth and ex-
clude the other parent from having a relationship with the child.25 '
Second, the non-biologically connected parent may end the relation-
ship prior to the birth of the child and refuse to support such child,
leaving the biological parent in a financially vulnerable state.25 In
some cases, the now single mother has to rely on state support.259 The
state has a long-standing interest, both financially and socially, in
having each child raised and supported by the two people who caused
255. This goal could also be achieved by having legislatures adopt a gender-neutral
version of § 201(b)(5) of the Uniform Parentage Act or by having courts interpret it in a
gender-neutral fashion regardless of marital status. As previously noted, this was done
in custody cases in California and New Jersey to ensure that a child has two parents, but
not necessarily one mother and one father.
256. It is important to recognize that marriage is largely an institution utilized by
those in the upper class. Blaine Harden, Numbers Drop for the Married with Children:
Institution Becoming the Choice of the Educated, Affluent, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2007, at
A-03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/03/
AR2007030300841.html. Therefore, state-recognized relationships creating parental rights
can serve as only one among many options for creating parental rights at the time of
family formation.
257. As discussed earlier, virtually no equitable remedies would be available to the same-
sex partner of a biologically-connected parent who has planned for, participated in, and
intended to parent a child yet to be born if the latter decides to end the relationship and
bar his or her partner from establishing a relationship with the child. See Joslin, supra
note 1, at 688-89. The key equitable remedy has been that of a psychological parent, which,
in part, requires that the non-biological parent has established a parent-like relationship
with the child. On the other hand, if a heterosexual unmarried mother decides to end her
relationship with her partner, even if the child was created through artificial insemination,
and the partner did not contribute genetic material, the partner would still be entitled to
parental rights to the child. By not recognizing similarly situated homosexual partners,
the law serves to undermine a family structure before it has even come to fruition.
258. See, e.g., State ex rel. D.R.M. v. Wood, 34 P.3d 887, 887 (Was. Ct. App. 2001)
(discussing non-biological former partner who ended relationship before discovering part-
ner was pregnant; when she discontinued support the biological former partner applied
for state assistance, but a court ruled the non-biological former partner was under no
duty to pay child support).
259. Id. at 890-91.
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that child to be created.2" By allowing for a simple application at the
planning stage, couples can be counseled so that both parties clearly
understand the lifetime obligations they are about to undertake, re-
gardless of whether their relationship endures.26'
Second-parent adoption can be eliminated in adoption cases by
permitting same-sex couples to jointly adopt. If a state wishes to bar
unmarried couples from adopting children, then it must allow same-
sex couples to marry. Although a state may be able to rationally artic-
ulate, with the support of scientific research, that a child may fare
better if it is born into a married household,262 it cannot rationally
articulate why same-sex couples who are bringing children into their
family should not marry, particularly with the support of this same
scientific research. Furthermore, creating a policy that prevents un-
married couples from adopting severely limits a state's policy on hav-
ing children adopted. Married couples with children represented only
21.6% of the population in 2006, indicating a continuing decline in
the last three decades.263 The key factor that states must consider is
that relying on the institution of marriage as the gatekeeper of adop-
tion unnecessarily privileges a decreasing portion of the population.
In the case of international adoptions, where other countries con-
tinue to bar same-sex couples from jointly adopting, each state could
use an adoption presumption similar to the District of Columbia.2"
As the state engages in its pre-adoption procedures for one parent,
it should allow for those same procedures to apply to the other par-
ent. Once a state has acknowledged that one of the partners is fit to
adopt, the other parent should likewise be acknowledged. Further-
more, an order should be created that declares at the time an inter-
national adoption has been formalized abroad, a presumption exists
that the adoption is simultaneously valid for the partner who re-
mained stateside.265
260. See Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291.
261. The more difficult process is managing parenthood for families who choose con-
ception outside of the traditional medical institutions that provide ART. In those cases,
a judicial declaration may be needed. See, e.g., Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 473,
476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (ruling that third-party semen donor and lesbian non-
biological mother could both have custodial and support obligations along with the lesbian
partner biological mother); A.(A.) v. B.(B.), [2007] 83 O.R.3d 561 (Can.) (declaring maternity
of lesbian non-biological mother to a child with a legally recognized biological mother and
actively involved sperm donor father).
262. See Storrow, supra note 3, at 308-09, n.9.
263. Press Release, United States Census Bureau, New Census Bureau Data Reveal
More Older Workers, Homeowners, Non-English Speakers (Sept. 12, 2007), http://www
.census. gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/american community-survey-acs/
010601.html.
264. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
265. However, this proposition seems unlikely under the recently ratified Hague
Convention rules on adoption and home studies. Same-sex couples will find it extremely
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For those couples wishing to adopt a heteronormative model of
family, same-sex marriage needs to be recognized on a nation wide
basis. Obviously, this is a long term goal, with DOMA creating a con-
siderable hurdle. However, William Meezan and Jonathan Rauch
make a strong argument when they say:
The... area where same-sex marriage might benefit children is
in the durability and stability of the parental relationship. In the
heterosexual world, a substantial body of research shows that
other things held equal, marriages are more durable and stable
than cohabitation.... To what extent this would be true of same-
sex couples is not as yet known in any rigorous way, but anecdotal
evidence suggests that a similar dynamic may apply. Gay cou-
ples who have formally married.., have attested that the act of
marriage has deepened their relationship - often to no one's
surprise more than their own.2""
It is important to note that none of the couples in the study suggested
that they wanted gay marriage to be legalized. However, that was be-
cause they did not see it as a family preservation tool in its current
status. They felt that it would not mean anything beyond the state
in which they resided and would not afford them any protections in
regard to their children. None of the couples expressed any under-
standing of the marital presumption and what it offers married cou-
ples who acquire children through reproductive technology. Allowing
same-sex couples the option to marry, however, provides a social legiti-
macy to the whole family unit. Under the parental presumption, the
non-biological parent would not have to adopt a child born to the
marriage, and a same-sex couple could jointly adopt a child. There
would be no "second" parent. It seems that in order to support the
status of both parents in the family, legally and culturally, the idea
of "second" parent should be dismantled."7
difficult to hide their sexual orientation and therefore, will likely find it more difficult
to adopt internationally. See World Organization for Cross-Border Co-operation in Civil
and Commercial Matters, supra note 17, at art. 5, 15, 17.
266. William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage, Same-Sex Parenting, and
America's Children, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 97, 108-09 (2005), available at http://www
.futureofchildren.org/usr-doc/06_FOC_15-2_fall05_Meezan-Rauch.pdf (emphasis omitted).
267. While others correctly argue that parental rights and responsibilities should be
disaggregated to allow for other family models, the couples in this study have chosen a
model in which both parents want the same parental rights and responsibilities. See
Jacobs, supra note 6, at 312, 313, 332, 338 (stressing the importance of the disaggre-
gation of parental rights to more accurately reflect the reality of many families to allow
children the full benefit of all relevant parental figures, and to grant parental rights as
individually appropriate and not necessarily equally); Laura T. Kessler, Community
Parenting, 24 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y. 47, 49, 72, 74 (2007) (discussing the prevalence of
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The status of marriage also creates a certain level of prestige
and clear assumptions around parental structures. Marriage, after
all, is a social investment in the family. As Perlesz et al. remark in
their study of parents, children and grandparents in lesbian families,
"[tihe lack of institutional recognition of 'the lesbian-parented family'
by public figures, such as health and welfare workers, educators, legal
bureaucrats and so on, has meant that the lesbian-parented family
is forever needing to redefine itself in its interactions with the pub-
lic domain." 26 For those gay and lesbian couples wishing to partake
in marriage, a socially familiar vocabulary exists in which to define
their roles, statuses, and relationships as they interact with other in-
stitutions and relate to society at large. The terms "civil unions" and
"domestic partnerships" do not culturally connote the same level of
status as marriage. One still needs to explain the family relation-
ship. Marriage comes with a culturally recognized order to familial
relationships.
Although same-sex marriage is a long way from being recognized
nationally, a first step in making marriage a meaningful tool to pre-
serve parent-child relationships would be to limit the power of DOMA.
Courts can play a role in moving legislatures and society to recognize
the importance of all family structures by giving narrow interpretation
to statutes that impede this process. For example, despite Virginia's
extreme stance against same-sex unions, the Virginia Supreme Court
in Miller-Jenkins found that the PKPA trumped the state's DOMA
statute, and thus preserved a parent-child relationship.269
In recognizing the power of the law to engage in social engineer-
ing, the court could have ruled that while DOMA may permit states
not to recognize same-sex relationships, DOMA cannot be interpreted
to deny the parent-child relationship that emerges from the presump-
tion of a same-sex couple's civil union, registered domestic partner-
ship, or marital relationship. Such a ruling would be consistent with
the Tenth Circuit's holding that states may not create legislation re-
fusing to recognize second-parent adoptions by gay and lesbian par-
ents that were finalized in other states.27 ° Although the legal basis of
the decision rested on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the impact
of the decision promoted the policy of preserving parent-child rela-
tionships. If courts ruled parental presumptions must be recognized
"'more-than-two' parent" families and the social, political and legal responses and
implications).
268. Perlesz et. al., supra note 6, at 177.
269. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 337-38 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
270. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), affd in
part, Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007).
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everywhere, such action would make clear the importance of a policy
that supports all family relationships.
In addition, Massachusetts recently held that residents of states
which do not allow same-sex marriage may marry in Massachusetts."'
This has led the Attorney General of Rhode Island to recommend
that the state recognize same-sex marriages performed in Massa-
chusetts.2 Likewise, New York's Governor Paterson has ordered all
state agencies to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. 3 Simi-
larly, Vermont has decided to study whether civil unions in Vermont
should be changed to marriages, thus eliminating a separate legal
category for same-sex families.274 These actions set the tone of what
is possible.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have explored the current state of parentage
options for same-sex couples, both legislatively and judicially, as well
as how same-sex couples respond to or understand these options as
they engage in family formation. The results of the research suggest
couples are not clear in their understanding of the rights they have
established and this lack of confidence in these legal protections
serves to undermine these families on both a macro and micro level.275
271. Cote-Whitacre v. Dep't. of Pub. Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 623 (Mass. 2006).
Furthermore, on July 15,2008 the Massachusetts Senate voted to repeal a 1913 law that
has prevented out-of-state same-sex couples from marrying in Massachusetts. The state
House of Representatives is expected to follow suit and Governor Deval Patrick plans
to sign the repeal. Stephen Braun, The Nation: Another Win for Gay Marriage, L.A.
TIMES, July 16, 2008, at A-12. Such action reflects the "norming" of gay marriage as its
prevalence has increased since its legalization in the state in 2004.
272. Katie Zezima, Rhode Island Steps Towards Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/22/us/
22rhode.html.
273. See Memorandum from David Nocenti, supra note 86.
274. John Curran, Vermont Calmly Puts Marriage on the Table, S. F. CHRON. (San
Francisco), Jan. 14, 2008, at A-4, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi
?f=/c/a/2008/01/14[MN4OUENJO.DTL&feed=rss.gay.
275. It is important to note several limitations to this study. First, the sample comes
from a singular geographical location that is not representative of most states, and in
fact, is not representative of Washington State. Therefore, other families may experience
more severe stress as they engage in family formation in communities that are more
hostile to same-sex couples. Second, the sample is quite small, and therefore not general-
izable. Third, the sample includes only highly-educated and highly-privileged families
who have the social capital to engage the legal system in a way most other same-sex
families do not. Again, this may mean other same-sex families experience the effects of
their legal ambiguity as parents more acutely than the families in this study. Further
research should focus on families residing in areas that are more hostile to same-sex
couples as well as focusing on same-sex couples who lack the resources to engage the
legal system to create parental rights where they do not ordinarily exist. Regardless, this
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Legislatures and courts have made significant strides in protecting
the parent-child relationship in same-sex families after the parents
have dissolved their relationship, but this comes at a colossal cost,
both financially and emotionally to the unprotected parent and the
child.276 States should work to create a solid foundation for same-sex
families as they enter parenthood whereby both partners can feel
confident in their legal and social status as mothers or fathers. It is
good policy to protect the parent-child relationship in newly emerging
families as well as in those that are no longer whole. In fact, a policy
that recognizes and supports both parents in same-sex families may
serve to reduce the number of children being raised in single parent
households, and thereby eliminate the need for judicially-created
parental rights at the time the partner exits coupledom. Our current
mix of laws has created the imprisoned family and in the process has
economically, socially, and emotionally undermined them. Using exist-
ing models as well as some of the recommendations discussed above,
lawyers, courts, and legislatures can set these families free.
study offers a crucial look at how the current state of the law impacts intact couples as
they engage in family formation.
276. Goldhaber, supra note 3, at 291-93.
2008]
